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Abstract
While the global nancial crisis was centered in the United States, it led to a surprising
appreciation in the dollar, suggesting global dollar illiquidity. In response, the Federal Reserve
partnered with other central banks to inject dollars into the international nancial system.
Empirical studies of the success of these eorts have yielded mixed results, in part because their
timing is likely to be endogenous. In this paper, we examine the cross-sectional impact of these
interventions. Theory consistent with dollar appreciation in the crisis suggests that their impact
should be greater for countries that have greater exposure to the United States through trade and
nancial channels, less transparent holdings of dollar assets, and greater illiquidity diculties.
We examine these predictions for observed cross-sectional changes in CDS spreads, using a new
proxy for innovations in perceived changes in sovereign risk based upon Google-search data. We
nd robust evidence that auctions of dollar assets by foreign central banks disproportionately
beneted countries that were more exposed to the United States through either trade linkages
or asset exposure. We obtain weaker results for dierences in asset transparency or illiquidity.
However, several of the important announcements concerning the international swap programs
disproportionately beneted countries exhibiting greater asset opaqueness.
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Although the recent crisis exposed fragilities throughout the global economy, there can be no doubt
that it originated and was centered in the United States. When diculties arose in sub-prime
mortgages in early 2007, investors became concerned about a wide set of U.S. assets, resulting in
re sales and the failure or near-failure of a number of systemically important U.S. nancial rms
[Bernanke (2009)]. Between October 2007 and October 2008, there was a $8 trillion sell o in U.S.
equity values [Brunnermeier (2009)]. A surprising feature of the recent nancial crisis is that at
its peak the American dollar actually rose in value. Going into the crisis, most thought that the
adjustment process to undo the large global imbalances that had built up during the boom would
include a sharp dollar depreciation [e.g. Krugman (2007)].
Instead, the crisis country currency appreciated [Engel (2009)]. For example, see Figure 1,
which plots the VIX and VSTOXX measures of US and European equity market volatility respec-
tively against the dollar-euro exchange rate during late 2008. The dollar exchange rate moved
quite closely with volatility in equity markets, as can be seen by examining plots of the VIX and
VSTOXX indices. This leads us to the view that the appreciation of the dollar resulted from a
ight to liquidity rather than solely a ight to safety. While there probably was some movement
towards safety [e.g. Fratzscher (2009), McCauley and McGuire (2009)], we concentrate on the
liquidity issue here. Many studies [e.g. Baba and Packer (2009b)] characterize the illiquidity as
a shortage in dollar funding suered by nancial institutions. Viewed from the prism of a global
dollar liquidity shortage due to the unique role played by the dollar in global nancial markets, the
temporary appreciation of the dollar is unsurprising.1
At the height of the crisis, the Federal Reserve extended dollar assets to major industrial
1Goldberg and Tille (2008) show that the dollar plays a prominent role in invoicing in international transactions,
even in many that do not involve agents from the United States. Similar concerns drive currency invoicing decisions
in debt issuance [Chinn and Frankel (2007)]. The impact of scale eects has been demonstrated in the case of the
advent of the euro, where the increased volume of existing issuance in euro relative to national currencies resulted in
a substantial move towards the euro in new issuance [Hale and Spiegel (2008)].
1countries, and several emerging markets' central banks to alleviate these dollar shortages.2 Obstfeld,
Shambaugh, and Taylor (2009) note that desirable alternatives to the swap arrangements did
not exist, as increased domestic currency extensions from local central banks could have led to
undesirable currency depreciation, and the use of foreign central bank dollar reserves would have
reduced their holdings, raising anxiety.3 They argue that the broad injection of dollar liquidity was
"... one of the most notable examples of central bank cooperation in history ..."
The evidence on the impact of central bank interventions as mixed. Some of the studies
[e.g. Taylor and Williams (2009)] nd no impact, while others, such as McAndrews, Sarkar, and
Wang (2008), nd signicant but small impacts. More recent studies, such as Baba and Packer
(2009b), concentrate on the most turbulent portion of the crisis and nd larger eects. However,
the endogeneity of these injections, which were provided when and where they were most needed,
poses a challenge in evaluating their impact.
Given these diculties, we examine the cross-sectional impacts of central bank eorts to ad-
dress dollar-funding shortages. We begin with a descriptive overview of the central bank responses
to the global nancial crisis, reviewing a number of the relevant empirical regularities that have
been found in the literature. We then discuss the implications of a theoretical model derived in a
companion paper [Rose and Spiegel (2011)] { and summarized in the appendix { that describes the
crisis as stemming from toxic American assets but still predicts the observed dollar appreciation.
We then bring the cross-sectional predictions of that model to the data to reassess the impact
of the attempts by the Federal Reserve and others to inject dollar liquidity into the global nancial
system. Theory suggests that the impact of these injections should be greater among countries that
have greater exposure to the United States through trade and nancial channels, less transparent
holdings of dollar assets, and greater illiquidity diculties. We test these hypotheses by examining
2Some have also suggested that the swaps were motivated by a desire to mitigate the aforementioned exchange
rate pressures.
3Some emerging market country swap arrangements reected their desire to avoid obtaining funds from the
International Monetary Fund, and may have more reected the need for hard currency reserves [e.g. Engel (2009)].
2the impact of announced U.S. dollar auctions by foreign central banks, weighted by the size and
average maturity of auctioned assets, on CDS spreads for a large cross-section of countries. We nd
robust evidence that the auctions disproportionately beneted countries that were more exposed
to the United States, either through trade or nancial channels, as the theory predicts. We obtain
weaker or incorrect results for national dierences in the impact of the auctions by the transparency
of their dollar holdings and measures of illiquidity.
We also examine the impacts of the major announcements concerning the international swap
arrangements. For several of the most important announcements, such as the one that removed
the ceilings on swaps with major foreign central bank partners and the announcement initiating
swap arrangements with a broader set of countries, our results for announcements roughly match
those for the actual auctions. However, for others, such as the actual launch of the program, we
nd disproportionate benets among countries exhibiting greater illiquidity.
The following section reviews the evidence in the literature on the impact of the central bank
swap lines on global nancial conditions. Section 3 discusses our base empirical specication.
Section 4 subjects our results to a battery of robustness tests. Lastly, section 5 concludes.
2 Evidence on the impact of the swap arrangements
Major announcements concerning international swap lines by the Federal Reserve during this period
are shown in Table 1. The rst is December 12, 2007, when the Federal Reserve announced its
swap arrangements with the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB).
These were initially capped at $20 and $4 billion respectively. With the increased turmoil in global
nancial markets in the fall of 2008, swap lines were extended and expanded. On September 18,
2008, lines were introduced for the Bank of England (BOE), the Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the
Bank of Canada, while lines with the ECB and the SNB were increased. Less than a week later,
3on September 24, swap facilities were introduced for the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Swedish
Riksbank, the Denmark National Bank, and the Norwegian Central Bank. In October of the same
year, existing lines were "uncapped," on October 13 for the BOE, the ECB and the SNB, and
on October 14 for the BOJ. Finally, on October 28, 2008, lines were introduced for New Zealand,
and on October 29, for Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Singapore.4 The range of swap lines was
also broadened over this period from longer-term oers (one to three months) to also include one
week and overnight oers, and from primarily repos and collateralized loans to also include foreign
exchange swaps [Ho and Michaud (2008)]. Other nations, including the Swiss National Bank and
the ECB, also entered into swap arrangements with other countries with funding needs in those
countries' currencies.
These swap lines allowed these foreign central banks to access dollar-denominated assets which
they could then lend to their nancial institutions that were experiencing dollar illiquidity. At the
height of the program at the end of 2008, draw downs reached $291 billion at the ECB, $122 billion
at the BOJ, and $45 billion at the Bank of England [Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010)].
Other central bank eorts to inject dollar liquidity were also initiated. The term auction facility
(TAF) program, aimed at providing funds to nancial institutions, was introduced in December of
2007. Through this facility, depository institutions were able to borrow directly from the Federal
Reserve without using the discount window [Taylor and Williams (2009)].5 The ECB also conducted
dollar term funding auctions. These were supported by the swap lines with the Federal Reserve
and provided dollar funds to institutions in the European Union with ECB-eligible collateral [Baba
and Packer (2009a)] (See Figure 2).
The volume of TAF auctions increased dramatically during the fall of 2008, coinciding with the
4See Ho and Michaud (2008) and Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010) for reviews of the details of the central
bank swap programs during the crisis.
5As Taylor and Williams (2009) point out, it is important to remember that the liquidity eects of the TAF
auctions are not due to any increase in total bank reserves of the amount of "high-powered money" in the nancial
system, as bank borrowing was oset by open market sales of securities.
4dates of the Lehman failure and the subsequent market turmoil. As nancial conditions improved,
however, the terms oered under the overseas swap facilities became less desirable. Oer rates for
dollar swap facility funds reached about 100 basis points higher than terms available to US and
some foreign nancial institutions under the TAF program. Moreover, by the rst quarter of 2009
the market terms had improved to the point that participation in central bank swaps would only
have been attractive to institutions lacking access to funds in private markets or lacking collateral
necessary to participate in the TAF program [Goldberg, Kennedy, and Miu (2010)]. The volume
of draw-downs decreased quickly as conditions improved.
The swap arrangements were a crucial part of eorts by global ocials to restore liquidity to
the nancial system, as evidenced by the enormous draw downs at the end of 2008. Table 2 reports
the volume and average tenor of the TAF funds auctioned by the four major central banks over the
course of our sample. It is clear that this injection of dollar-denominated capital was large, with
volumes peaking in the fall of 2008 for the four major foreign central banks.6
A number of studies have emerged attempting to gauge the success of the programs in im-
proving global dollar liquidity. In an early study, Taylor and Williams (2009) examine the impact
of the TAF auctions. They nd no impact of these auctions on the 3-month spread of unsecured
LIBOR lending rates over overnight index swaps (OIS), which they take as a proxy for interest rate
expectations. There work was followed by a number of researchers, including McAndrews, Sarkar,
and Wang (2008), who argued that a proper assessment of the impact of the TAF auctions required
looking only at changes in the LIBOR-OIS spreads on days of announcements and auction oper-
ations. Using this methodology, they nd that the TAF auctions and announcements accounted
a cumulative reduction of more than 50 basis points in the OIS-LIBOR spread. Moreover, they
nd that international TAF auctions also had a statistically signicant and even larger impact on
6The popularity of the swap arrangements imply some market failure in international nancial markets, particularly
among the major central banks who under normal circumstances would likely be able to raise adequate funds on their
own.
5spreads than domestic auctions. Both McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008) and subsequent work
by Taylor and Williams (2008) based on spreads nd that announcements had larger impacts than
actual auctions.
Other eorts to characterize the impact of the central bank dollar injections concentrate on
evidence from the FX swap market. As discussed in Baba and Packer (2009b), disruptions in the FX
swap market began appearing at the height of the nancial crisis. FX swap prices began to reect
increases in perceived counter-party risk among European nancial institutions, as doubts grew
about the abilities of these institutions to fulll their dollar obligations. This resulted in deviations
from short-term covered interest parity. Baba and Packer (2009b) nd that the establishment of
the international fund lines, as well as the dollar term funding auctions nanced by these swaps,
had a signicant downward impact on observed deviations from covered interest parity in the FX
swap market. They obtain mixed results, as US dollar auctions are found to have had a robust
negative impact on deviations to covered interest parity subsequent to the Lehman failure, but not
before. Similar results are reported in Baba and Packer (2009a) and Hui, Genberg, and Chung
(2010).
The impact of the central bank actions on a broader set of countries is examined by Aizenman
and Pasricha (2010). They concentrate on emerging market economies that were granted swap
arrangements by the Federal Reserve at the height of the crisis. They demonstrate that the set of
emerging market economies that received swap arrangements were selected in part on the basis of
having exceptionally large outstanding obligations to the Federal Reserve. Their results indicate
that the establishment of swap arrangements had little impact on national credit default swap
spreads, but did contribute to exchange rate appreciation, or at least stemmed exchange rate
depreciation.7
7 More recently, there have also been eorts to assess the impact of the large scale asset purchase (LSAP) program
conducted by the Federal Reserve. These studies, including Hamilton and Wu (2011), Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2011), and D'Amico and King (2011) all nd substantial impacts of the LSAP programs had substantial
impacts on interest rates.
6Overall, it is safe to characterize the evidence on the impact of central bank interventions as
mixed. Even the work of McAndrews, Sarkar, and Wang (2008), which was subsequently conrmed
by Taylor and Williams (2008), only nds about a 2 basis point impact of TAF events on LIBOR-
OIS spreads. While it may not be surprising that the dollar auctions had their greatest eect
during the height of the turmoil, it is safe to say that the magnitude of the observed responses
during the pre-Lehman period was disappointing. Indeed, it was during this period unprecedented
policies were adopted, providing a reminder that while this period was not turbulent relative to
what immediately followed, it was still exceptional relative to recent historical data.
A number of diculties have been pointed out with time series-based evidence. One problem
is that these approaches implicitly ascribe all movements not covered by measured changes in
counter-party risk to the policy action, while a substantial number of other developments were
simultaneously taking place [Taylor and Williams (2009)]. Another is that there is clear evidence
that central bank swap policies have been endogenous: Central bank swap partners were clearly
not chosen at random. Moreover, Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) nd that the set of emerging
market economies chosen as candidates for swap arrangements are notable in the magnitude of
their outstanding US debt obligations. In addition, the timing of the largest interventions exactly
coincides with the period of greatest turmoil. Finally, one would think that private agents would
consider an announcement concerning the design of the international swap program as revealing
something about the central banks' views about the severity of the crisis situation. The time series
evidence has diculty separating the direct impact of the program from its impact through private
sector expectations.8
8One notable exception is D'Amico and King (2011) who identify signicant impacts of the LSAP programs in a
cross-section of securities. Moreover, they identify eects of pre-announced asset purchases, which they term "ow
eects," which are related to the pre-announced injections of dollar liquidity on auction dates that we study below.
73 Empirical specication
Given the problems discussed in the previous section with existing methodologies, along with the
mixed results in the literature, our empirical strategy is to identify cross-sectional restrictions that
can be taken to the data to identify the impact of the central bank actions. This approach avoids
the timing and endogeneity issues associated with the event-study approaches in the literature.
In this section, we rst review theoretical underpinnings motivating heterogeneity in the expected
impact of the auctions. We then introduce our data set and present basic results.
3.1 Theoretical motivation
It seems natural to turn to the literature on money demand based on microeconomic frictions to
examine the role of dollar illiquidity in the surprising dollar appreciation during the recent crisis.
Early studies, such as Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) and Trejos and Wright (1995) established that
a role for money that leads to positive money demand can be motivated within a search model
where money acts as a convenient medium of exchange due to its superior liquidity, avoiding
the need for a double coincidence of wants. More recently, Lagos and Wright (2005) develop a
tractable search-based monetary model by dividing each period into two sub-periods: In the rst,
agents enter a centralized market in which all goods and assets clear in a very standard manner.
However, agents then move on to a decentralized market with anonymous bilateral matching and
a double-coincidence problem. The combination of these two markets allows for the incorporation
of bargaining under interesting conditions, including the possibility of illiquidity, with tractability
ensured by the fact that the next period all agents reunite in the centralized market, where outcomes
are degenerate and in particular do not depend on the distribution of money holdings across agents.
This methodology was extended further in Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2009b), who develop
a closed-economy model where assets dier in their general acceptability, and hence liquidity. In
their model, assets may be of high or low quality, and agents that are uninformed refuse to accept
8low quality assets in exchange.9
In a companion paper [Rose and Spiegel (2011)], whose details are summarized in the appendix
of this paper, we develop an international version of the search-based asset model of Lagos and
Wright (2005).10 In this model, assets dier in their returns, their "opaqueness," and in their
liquidity. The possibility of illiquidity arises because, as in Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2009b),
agents trading in decentralized markets reject opaque assets whose value they don't recognize. We
demonstrate that a decline in the yield on the opaque US asset decreases the stock of dollar assets
available for transactions purposes, and raises demand for other US assets, such as currency, thereby
resulting in an appreciation of the dollar exchange rate. Broadly, we interpret the decline in the
yield on the real asset as analogous to the fall in the perceived value of exotic US assets during the
global nancial crisis, and the appreciation of the dollar relative to the value of the other national
currency as analogous to an increase in the relative yield of safe US assets.11
This model has implications for the predicted impact of the central bank auctions conducted
with dollar funds obtained from the Federal Reserve. We consider the capital injections under the
swap program as analogous to an increase in the stock of dollar assets held by agents on entering
the market that exhibits dollar illiquidity.12 In the appendix, we demonstrate that the benets
of this injection are increasing in three characteristics: The rst is the probability of needing to
transact in US dollars in the decentralized market, which we proxy with alternative measures of
exposure, as agents with greater exposure to the United States are more likely to nd themselves
9See Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2009a) for a demonstration that equilibria in which agents reject assets that
they do not recognize at any price are feasible.
10Geromichalos and Simonovska (2010) and Liu (2010) also develop international versions of the Lagos and Wright
model. We also include full proofs of the results used in this paper in a technical appendix posted online at
http://www.frbsf.org/economics/economists/mspiegel/wp11-18appendix.pdf.
11We do not want to suggest that this channel was the only source of dollar illiquidity. Brunnermeier (2009)
discusses the "liquidity spirals" that resulted from declines in asset prices that deteriorated bank balance sheet
positions, leading to further tightening of lending standards. Emerging market countries also had a need for foreign
currency reserves.
12One additional benet of the swap programs that is outside of our formal model was that nancial institutions
were not given cash, but US Treasury securities that are commonly admissable as collateral.
9in need of dollars for transactions or servicing liabilities. The second is the probability of being
paired with an uninformed agent, which we interpret as reected in the "opaqueness" of a country's
aggregate dollar holdings. Finally, the impact is predicted to be increasing in the severity of dollar
illiquidity in the country.13
3.2 Base Specication
Our base specication includes examines the cross-sectional restrictions implied by the theory.
Initially, we look at an event study specication by examining the average implications of the
TAF auctions across the sample, measured by an event dummy corresponding to the week of
the auctions, along with interactive slope variables to capture the extra sensitivity exhibited by
countries of certain characteristics suggested theoretically. In addition, we include a number of
conditioning variables. Our initial specication is14
CDSit = i + t + 1Exposureit  SP500t + 2Exposureit  auctiont 1
+3Transpit  auctiont 1 + 4Illiquidit  auctiont 1 + 54Defaultit + it:
where CDSit represents the change in CDS spreads on country i sovereign debt during week t; i
is a country dummy; Exposureit represents exposure to the United States, measured as discussed
above; SP500t represents the annualized percentage change in the S&P 500. auctiont 1 is equal
13Peter and McGuire (2009) also argue that exposure matters, arguing that dierences in nancial system balance
sheet exposure to US assets are likely to be positively correlated with dollar shortage vulnerabilities. While our model
literally looks at liquidity shortages in trade, we also consider nancial exposure to the United States, such as the
exposure measures in Rose and Spiegel (2009b).
14We examined two additional specications. First,we conducted an event study specication examining the average
implications of the TAF auctions across the sample along with the interactive slope and conditioning variables used in
our base specication. Here the results were disappointing, as can be seen in Table A1, which mirror the weak event
study results in the literature. The interacted exposure variable consistently obtains its expected negative coecient
value, but is usually insignicant. Moreover, the auctiont 1 variable consistently enters with the wrong positive sign,
although it is almost always insignicant. Second, we added the variables of interest on their own, i.e. not interacted
with the TAF volume and tenor. The results were much the same as those reported for our base specication, and
are shown in Table A2.
10to the sum of the volume of each auction during week t 1 times the average tenor of that auction
in weeks where auctions took place, and 0 in weeks with no auctions.15 Transpit represents dollar
asset transparency, measured as the ratio of dollar equity holdings to the sum of holdings of dollar
equities plus short and long-term agency debt; Illiquidit represents asset illiquidity, measured as the
ratio of short-term US liabilities to total exports; 4Defaultit conditions for changes in perceived
default risk, based on our proxy from Google search, discussed below; and it is a disturbance term,
assumed to be well behaved.
Our three variables of interest are the interactive terms representing the relative impact of the
auctions on country i dollar liquidity by exposure, asset transparency, and illiquidity: Exposureit 
auctiont 1, Transpit  auctiont 1, and Illiquidit  auctiont 1.
The remainder of the variables are nuisance terms meant to capture other potential determi-
nants of movements in sovereign CDS spreads, including Exposureit  SP500t, which is meant to
pick up the impact on country i of other economic developments in the US, auctiont, which is meant
to pick up the average impact of the TAF auctions across countries, and 4Defaultit which is our
Google measure meant to capture changes in the public's perception of default risk in country i. i
and t represent country and time dummies respectively.16 The time xed eects address a number
of issues: the foreign TAF auctions were just one component of a number of policy responses by
the Federal Reserve, as well as both the US Treasury, and Treasuries and central banks around the
world. In addition, the composition of borrowers and the size and tenor of sap arrangements varied
over the course of the policy as the swap programs were expanded. However, these xed eects
would be collinear with the auctiont 1 variable, as the timing, total volume and average tenor of
15We use lagged weeks for the auction variable because many auctions took place late in the week, requiring some
time for the market response in terms of the impact on other nations to be felt. Recall that these auction events have
all been previously announced, and hence are not surprises.
16While our specication is of weekly frequency, we only use monthly time dummies in the above specication.
When we use weekly time dummies, all of the variables, including both our variables of interest and the nuisance
parameters are very insignicant, as can be seen in Table A4 in the appendix.
11auctions are common across countries.17
3.3 Data
3.3.1 Standard data
Our full sample is based on weekly data, and runs from December 10, 2007 to December 31, 2009.
Our sample is a broad panel of emerging market and smaller developed economies, and includes 30
OECD and 38 non-OECD countries.
We consider two types of measures of "exposure" to the United States. First, we consider
trade-related measures, such as Exports, Imports and total Trade with the United States, as a
share of total global trade. These variables are closer to the explicit model above, in the sense that
we would expect that agents with more trade with the United States would be more likely to nd
themselves with potentially protable trade opportunities with US nationals. We use monthly data
on trade exposure to the United States from the IMF Direction of Trade statistics.
We also consider a variety of measures of asset exposure, including Assets(TIC), which mea-
sures total holding of US assets based on TIC data as a share of global assets measured using the
IMF CPIS data set. We also consider two subsets of this data, Debt, and LTDebt, which measure
total claims on US debt and total claims on US log-term debt respectively. Both numerator and
denominator of these variables are available only annually.18 Assets(CPIS) represents an annual
proxy for US asset exposure as a share of total global asset holdings, according to the IMF CPIS
data set.19 Estimation is done by OLS using robust standard errors clustered by country.
17We examine the possibility of extra sensitivity in the countries directly receiving the auction funds below.
18The TIC data is measured is data is annual, based on exposure in June, while the CPIS data is annual, based
on December exposure. We use TIC data for a given year as a proxy for exposure from July of the previous year to
June of the current year, and use CPIS data for a given year as a measure of exposure from January to December of
that same year. Ratios are then constructed from these monthly series as global exposure is only available from the
CPIS data set. This led to some calculated ratios for these variables having implausible values, either less than 0 or
greater than 1. In response, we censor these variables to have minimum value 0.01 and maximum value 1.
19Below, we report results based on trade and asset exposure as separate specications. However, we also ran
12Data on foreign central bank auctions was obtained from the Federal Reserve Board of Gov-
ernors, as were the details of announcements concerning changes in the Federal Reserve's swap
program. We condition auction "events" for two characteristics: volume in overall dollar value
and average tenor in days of length of contracts auctioned. The latter adjustment is important
because securities auctioned varied from high maturities of 95 days to maturities as low as one day,
representing substantially dierent levels of eective liquidity injections per dollar issued (see Table
2 for summary statistics for major central banks).
We obtain weekly percentage changes in CDS spreads and S&P500 returns from Bloomberg.
3.3.2 Default risk proxy from Google search
Our primary non-standard data series is a proxy for perceived changes in country creditworthi-
ness. Since LIBOR rates are limited to a small set of developed nations, we follow Aizenman and
Pasricha (2010) in using dierences in CDS spreads as our indicator of liquidity risk.20 Of course,
changes in country creditworthiness will also aect CDS spreads, so we need to condition on coun-
try creditworthiness in order to isolate the movements in CDS spreads attributable to liquidity
changes. This is problematic for the broad cross section that we use in our study, as many of the
countries in our sample do not have widely-traded instruments that one might typically consider as
potential indicators of changes in a country's creditworthiness. Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) use
Economist Intelligence Unit data for their sample of emerging market economies, but such data is
only available monthly.
In response, we use weekly search data obtained from Google Insights for Search. Based
specications with a form of both types of exposure included, and obtained similar results. We also investigate a
number of alternative exposure measures. First, we normalize exposure by country GDP instead of global exposure.
Second, we account for the fact that exposure to Europe is likely to be poorly measured because European assets
are often held in tax havens in other countries in two ways: we look at bank exposure to the US, which is available
consistently for all countries, and we also aggregate across the euro area. Our results are largely robust to all of these
alternative exposure measures, as shown in appendices A10, A11, and A12.
20Aizenman and Pasricha (2010) provide a theoretical model that links liquidity with CDS spreads.
13on their own description [e.g. Google (2011)], Google Insights for Search analyzes a portion of
worldwide Google web searches from all Google domains to compute how many searches have been
done for a chosen group of terms relative to the total number of searches done on Google over time.
Google search data has been used in a number of studies. Choi and Varian (2009) use search
data results to predict levels of economic activity for automobile sales and unemployment gures.
Mondria, Wu, and Zhang (2010) nd that increased search volume on Google is associated with
greater inward investment and Da, Engelberg, and Gao (2011) demonstrate that increased activity
is associated with temporary increases in equity values. In both of these studies, the eect is
attributed to increased "attention."
Such real-time data is most often used to describe current economic conditions, rather than
forecast future ones, in a growing application commonly referred to as "nowcasting." Studies have
veried a number of cases where the Google search data have added information over and above
that available from other sources [e.g. Varian (2010) and Kholodin, Podstawski, and Siliverstovs
(2010)].
This is the sense in which we use the Google search data in our study. To measure changes in
the perceived sovereign risk of a country, we use the relative incidence of searches of words related
to default risk combined with that country's name. The percentage change in search volume for a
given country combined with these default-related terms is then used as as a proxy for changes in
concerns about default risk about that country.21
A number of features of Google Insights should be pointed out. Responses are reported on a
scale of 0 through 100. Figures are scaled by the highest volume response, which is given score
100. Remaining gures are then scored as their values as a share of the top reported value. Google
21We freely acknowledge that our Google data might be a better gauge of popular concern about a particular
country's default risk, rather than that held by market professionals, as they more likely use propriety sources of
data. Still, our results below demonstrate that there is a correlation with sovereign credit ratings, which presumably
reect the opinions of market participants rather than the general public.
14also normalizes its series by a common variable, so values represent likelihoods of searches for a
given country, rather than the absolute number of searches. This leaves all series country-specic.
However, these series suit our purposes because we are only interested in the changes in our series
over time, and the normalizations drop out.
One potential problem with our use of Google Insights as a proxy for changes in perceived
default risk is that for proprietary reasons Google does not provide numerical values for responses
when they fall below a certain threshold. For our purposes here, we proxy the numerical value
for such observations as equivalent to the lowest reported value, which is clearly an upper-bound
estimate of its true value.
To increase the potential correlation between our proxy and actual perceptions of creditworthi-
ness, we choose a set of credit-risk related search words that are correlated with observed changes
in perceived creditworthiness. Obviously, other estimates of changes in perceived country risk are
not available at the high frequency that we use in our cross-section panel; this is what drove us to
use the Google search data in the rst place. We therefore examine the validity of our proxy by
determining its correlation with other measures of default risk at the lower frequencies at which
those other measures are available.
We begin with a set of 33 default-related words. While it would be desirable to evaluate all of
the possible combinations of these words, this methodology is not possible because of restrictions
placed by Google on the total number of searches that can be conducted on a single day.22
In response, we developed a simple algorithm to choose the set of default-related terms we
use to conduct the Google searches. First, we generated a full set of searches with each of the
countries in our sample and one of the 33 default-related terms. We then regressed panels of these
combinations of searches by countries and single default-related terms on monthly changes in Fitch
sovereign ratings. We examine three series, foreign and domestic long term debt obligations and
22We search over 112 countries for every variety of default-related terms.
15short-term foreign obligations. Of these, we were most interested in the results for foreign long-term
obligations.
Our results for foreign long-term obligations are shown in Table A3.23 We found three words
which entered signicantly for all of the Fitch series: crisis, nancial, and freeze.24 We then ran
searches with these three terms and one of the remaining words. This yielded six words which
improved the t of the Google searches with in-sample changes in Fitch ratings: "credit", "debt",
"exposure", "liability", "recession", and "safety". We chose the set of four words that t the best,
which added the word "recession." We then examined the implications of adding a fth word from
this list. None of these improved the t of our ratings changes regressions, so we settled on searches
mentioning a country and one of four default-related terms: crisis, nancial, freeze, and recession.
Correlations in the data between search volume and bond ratings changes are demonstrated in
Figure 3. We plot the Google series for four countries, Iceland, Latvia, Greece and Ireland. Data
availability diers by country, from as far back as 2004 for Ireland to 2008 for Iceland. However, all
countries have data for the bulk of the crisis period. It can be seen that there is a lot of variability
in the data, but all four countries appear to have credit downgrading episodes that correspond to
local spikes in the Google series. Of course, there are lots of other spikes in the Google data that
do not correspond to a credit downgrading event, and the relationship does not always appear to
be exactly contemporaneous. Still, we would at least like to feel certain that changes in the Google
ratings do correspond to changes in search volumes.
To investigate this question more formally, we considered the following panel specication for
our entire cross-country sample:
23Results for domestic long-term and foreign short-term are available on request.
24We also found that the word "danger" entered signicantly for short-term obligations, but neither of the other
series. When adding this word to the 3 word base, however, the quality of t deteriorated. In response, we continued
with the 3 word base discussed in the text.
16%Ratingit = t + i + 1Googleit + it: (1)
where Ratingit is the change in country i's Fitch credit rating at time t, with one point for each
change, t and i are time and country dummy variables respectively, %Googleit is the variable
of interest, the percentage change in the Google default proxy (hereafter referred to as default),
and it is an independent error term, assumed to be well-behaved.
Our results are shown in Table 3 for both the full time series over which Google search data
is available and a smaller time series that corresponds to the period covered in our study below.
Data is monthly, and our specication includes country and time xed eects.
It can be seen that there is a strong negative relationship between ratings changes and Google
search volumes in our full data panel, that is robust across the three dierent asset categories
whose ratings we consider. The estimated coecient values suggest that a doubling of Google
search volume is predicted to, for example, result in a downgrade of foreign short-term debt equal
to 6 basis points, even after controlling for changes in global conditions through the time xed
eects, for the time series corresponding to our study below.
We nd it reassuring that the Google search volume data tracks this manifestation of changes
in expectations about sovereign default risk in the manner we desire. We therefore use changes
in the volume of Google index searches for a country name and one of the words associated with
sovereign risk listed above as a proxy for changes in the public perception of default risk for that
country.25
25As a robustness check, we also took an ad hoc set of default-related terms and used search results for that string
instead of the stepwise procedure discussed above. These words included "risk", "default", "recession", "decit",
"debt", "crisis", and bankruptcy. Our reported results were robust to this alternative proxy, and are shown in Table
A13.
173.4 Results
Our results are shown in Table 4. In terms of the three variables of interest, the interactive Exposure
variable consistently obtains a negative sign, either for trade-related measures of exposure (Models
1 through 3), or for the measures of asset exposure (Models 4 through 7), with the exception of
Model 5 which obtains the predicted negative sign, but is insignicant.
Moreover, the coecient estimates suggest that discrepancies across countries with dierent
exposure levels are substantial. Our dependent variable is measured in percentage changes in CDS
spreads, which implies that the predicted decrease in CDS spreads from a week with average auction
volume and tenor in our sample would be 36.5 basis points larger for a country with one standard
deviation higher trade exposure to the United States as measured by our Trade variable. Similarly,
the predicted decrease in CDS spreads from a week with average auction volume and tenor in our
sample would be 26.2 basis points larger for a country with one standard deviation higher asset
exposure to the United States, as measured by our Assets(TIC) variable.26
The interactive Transp variable robustly enters signicantly with its unpredicted negative
sign. This suggests that this variable is likely picking up some benet from having a relatively
large stock of US Treasuries that allowed countries to fare disproportionately well on weeks with
TAF auctions that is outside of our theoretical model. It may be that those countries whose public
and private agents hold a transparent US dollar portfolio { measured in our data as the share of
long and short-term US treasuries in total US holdings { have a greater need for dollar liquidity
during crisis periods than those that do not. This need may be time-varying, and therefore not
conditioned for by our country xed eects.
Finally, the interactive Illiquid variable is insignicant throughout.
26These calculations are based on the standard deviation of of the Trade exposure measure in our sample being
0.10, the mean values of weekly auction volume*tenor being 1.15, and the standard deviation of the Assets(TIC)
variable being 0.41
18Among our nuisance parameters, the Exposureit SP500t variable is again signicant with its
predicted negative sign throughout, while the 4Defaultit obtains its predicted positive coecient
estimate, but is statistically insignicant throughout, with the exception of Model 5 which measures
exposure as the share of U.S. asset holdings using the CPIS data.
We conclude that the foreign TAF auctions disproportionately beneted those countries more
exposed to the United States, either through trade or asset exposure. However, we obtained exactly
the wrong sign for the opaqueness of US asset holdings, suggesting that we pick up an eect not
predicted by our theory. Finally, we obtained insignicant results for the interactive illiquidity
variable.
4 Robustness Tests
In this section, we subject our chosen base specication to a number of robustness checks, including
using alternative measures of illiquidity, alternative sub-samples of the data, and examining the
impact of announcements concerning the international swap arrangements, rather than the auctions
themselves.27
27We also conducted a number of other robustness tests which are reported as appendix tables. First, we considered
changes in exchange rates, both as a potential additional independent variable, as they might represent an alternative
driver of CDS spreads, and as a dependent variable, as changes in exchange rate pressure might be an alternative
outcome of the auctions. Our results are reported in Tables A14 and A15 respectively. Our base regression results are
robust to the inclusions of the exchange rate as an additional right hand side variable. However, we get far dierent
results for the impact of the auctions on exchange rates. We nd that illiquid countries experienced signicantly
greater relief in exchange rate pressure, usually at statistically signicant levels, but the exposure variables are all
insignicant. Of course, many things may drive exchange rate movements beyond the explicit model above and
in patterns that are not well understood by economists. We also examined changes in LIBOR-OIS spreads as an
alternative dependent variable. We have a much smaller sample, as we are limited to 8 countries. The results are
shown in Table A16. We continue to obtain negative coecient estimates throughout for exposure, but only at
statistically signicant levels in two of the 7 specications. However, an additional specication is signicant at a
10% condence level.
194.1 Alternative Illiquidity Measures
We consider three alternative liquidity measures. These include short-term debt as a share of
GDP, the ratio of short-term debt to international reserves, and the "Greenspan-Guidotti" illiq-
uidity measure, which is measured as the ratio of short-term debt minus international reserves
to international reserves.28 Except for these alternative illiquidity measures, we keep our base
specication and again consider all seven exposure measures used above.
Our results are shown in Table 5. For space considerations, we only report the results for the
three interactive variables of interest.29 We rst measure illiquidity as the ratio of short-term debt
to GDP. It can be seen that the results are qualitatively identical to those in our base specication.
The interactive exposure variable are signicantly negative throughout, with the exception of Model
5 with similar coecient values. The interactive transparency variable again enters signicantly
with a negative sign throughout, while the interactive illiquidity variable is insignicant.
We next measure illiquidity in terms of the ratio of short-term debt to reserves. This specica-
tion again obtains a statistically signicant negative sign for all of the interactive exposure variables
except Model 5, negative and signicant coecient estimates on the interactive transparency vari-
ables, and insignicant coecient estimates for the illiquidity measure.
Finally, we use the "Greenspan-Guidotti" measure of illiquidity, namely the ratio of short-term
debt to reserves minus one. The interactive exposure measure again enters signicantly with its
expected negative sign for all of the trade-related exposure measures, but is signicant for only
one of the nancial exposure variables, that of Model 5 which measures exposure as the ratio of
holdings of US assets as a share of total global asset holdings.
The interactive transparency variable continues to obtain a negative coecient, but is now
28The latter two terms are similar, but the interaction with the volume and tenor variables imply that they are
not identical, as shown in the results.
29The full results are in appendix tables A6, A7, and A8.
20insignicant throughout. The interactive illiquidity variable is again insignicant, except for the
Model 4 sspecication that measures US exposure using the Assets TIC data.30
While the nancial exposure measures were a little weaker using the "Greenspan-Guidotti"
measure of illiquidity, overall the results of the base regression reported above appear to be robust
to the alternative illiquidity measures we entertained here.
4.2 Alternative Samples
We next consider dividing up our pooled sample into OECD and non-OECD sub-samples. It is
quite plausible that these groups experienced dierent impact of the foreign TAF auctions. We
again use our base specication with the seven dierent exposure measures.
The results for the OECD sub-sample are shown in Table 6. These results are quite similar to
those in our base specications, and stronger in some dimensions. The exposure variables all enter
signicantly with their expected negative signs including that of Model 5 this time. Moreover, the
coecient values are somewhat larger than those we obtained for the full sample. Moreover, the
coecient estimates suggest that discrepancies across countries with dierent exposure levels are
again substantial.
For the OECD sub-sample, we nd that the predicted decrease in CDS spreads from a week
with average auction volume and tenor in our sample would be 44.8 basis points larger for a country
with one standard deviation higher trade exposure to the United States as measured by our Trade
variable. Similarly, the predicted decrease in CDS spreads from a week with average auction volume
and tenor in our sample would be 33.1 basis points larger for a country with one standard deviation
higher asset exposure to the United States, as measured by our Assets(TIC) variable.31
30One problem with our liquidity measures is that Ireland is a major outlier. For example, Ireland's Greenspan-
Guidotti illiquidity measure is standard deviations above the mean. Nevertheless, we obtained similar results through-
out after dropping Ireland.
31These calculations are based on the standard deviation of of the Trade exposure measure in our sample being
0.08, the mean values of weekly auction volume*tenor being 1.15, and the standard deviation of the Assets(TIC)
21Among the other variables, the interactive transparency and illiquidity variables are insignif-
icant throughout, with the exception of Model 3, where illiquidity enters at a 5% condence level
with an incorrect positive sign. The S&P500 variable again also enters consistently with its ex-
pected negative sign at statistically signicant levels. The biggest change is in the performance
of the Google-based default proxy. This variable now enters with its predicted positive sign at
statistically signicant levels for all of our specications. It seems that this proxy is more adept at
picking up changes in default perception among the OECD country sub-sample.
This perception is conrmed for the non-OECD country sub-sample, which yields much weaker
results (Table A5). In particular, the Google-based proxy enters with the incorrect, although usually
insignicantly for the non-OECD sub-sample. This discrepancy with the OECD sub-sample may
reect the fact that this crisis hit wealthier countries harder than emerging market economies Rose
and Spiegel (2009a). It may also reect the greater search volume found among OECD countries.
Still, despite the poor performance of the default proxy, the remaining qualitative results are quite
similar to those in the full sample.
4.3 Announcement Eects
We also examine the impact of the announcements listed in Table 1. We divide up the seven
announcements listed into those applying to what we term the "major central banks," the ECB,
the BOE, the SNB, the BOJ and the Bank of Canada, and those dealing with the central banks of
other economies. We have three major bank announcement weeks: 1) The week including December
12, 2007, when the Federal Reserve initially announced the central bank swap programs with the
ECB and the SNB, 2) the week including September 18, 2008, when swap lines were introduced with
the BOJ, the BOE, the Bank of Canada and funds were increased for the ECB and the SNB, and
3) the week including October 13 and 14, 2008, when the ceilings on swap magnitudes were lifted
variable being 0.30
22with the ECB, the BOE, the SNB, and the BOJ. We have two weeks with major announcements
concerning other central banks, including September 24, 2008, when swap lines were introduced
with Australia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, and the week of October 28 and 29, 2008, when
swap lines were introduced with the reserve banks of New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, Korea and
Singapore.
Unlike the anticipated auctions examined above, we consider the "event week" associated with
the announcements as the week in which the announcement was made. The intuition behind this
assumption is that information ows are likely to be close to instantaneous, while the liquidity
eects of anticipated injections of capital on other countries may take some time to establish.
We examine the impacts of these announcements by interacting our three variables of interest,
Exposure, Transp and Illiquid with two announcement date dummies, labeled by the date of
the rst important announcement of that week. We also include the auction information included
in the specications above for completeness, but these coecient values are suppressed for space
reasons.32 The remainder is the same as our base specication.
The results for the major central bank announcements are shown in Table 7a. One can see that
the impact of the announcements varied widely throughout the crisis. For the week of December
12, 2007, the interactive exposure variables are all insignicant. However, the transparency vari-
ables all now enter with their expected positive signs at statistically signicant levels. Moreover,
the interactive illiquidity variable enters with its expected negative sign throughout, although at
statistically signicant levels in only four of the seven specications.
For the the week including October 13 and 14, 2008, when the ceilings on swaps with the
major central banks were lifted, the interactive exposure variable enters negatively throughout, and
is statistically signicant for specications, except Model 5. The interactive Transp variable again
universally enters negatively at statistically signicant levels. Moreover, the interactive illiquidity
32These values are printed in Table A9.
23variable usually obtains a negative sign, but is insignicant throughout. The similarity between
these results and those of our base regressions is striking. Of course, this announcement also
coincided with the height of the crisis, a time when TAF auction activity was also peaking. The
similarities with the results for auction volumes and tenors is therefore not surprising.
We next turn to the announcements concerning swap arrangements with other central banks.
These are shown in Table 7b. In the September 24, 2008 announcement, when swap lines were in-
troduced with Australia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, we obtain negative coecient estimates
on the exposure variable throughout, but only at statistically signicant levels in Model 5. How-
ever, we again obtain positive and statistically signicant coecient estimates on the interactive
transparency variable throughout. The illiquidity measure is universally insignicant.
The nal announcement, that of October 28 and 29, 2008, when swap lines were introduced
with the reserve banks of New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Singapore, seems to be more
similar to the October 13 announcement discuss above. The interactive exposure variables enter
negatively throughout,and at 1% condence levels for ve of the seven specications. The inter-
active transparency variable again enters negatively for all specications at statistically signicant
levels throughout, while the illiquidity variable is mixed and insignicant for all specications except
Model 2.
Overall, the results for the announcement dates were mixed across event dates. The results for
two of the announcement weeks { October 13 and 14, 2008, when the ceilings on swaps with the
major central banks were lifted, and October 28 and 29, 2008, when swap lines were introduced with
the reserve banks of New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, Korea and Singapore { were very similar to those
obtained for base specication of the actual auctions above. In particular, we obtained statistically
signicant coecient estimates for all of our US exposure measures. However, for two of the other
event weeks (that containing December 12, 2007 when the swap lines were originally introduced and
that containing September 24, 2008, when the swap program was broadened to include Australia,
24Sweden, Denmark, and Norway) the coecient estimate on the interactive transparency variable
entered for the rst time with its predicted positive coecient estimate at statistically signicant
levels.
It seems plausible that the results for the announcements in October were similar to those
of the actual auctions because it was during that month that auction volume peaked. However,
it seems dicult to draw parallels between the two event dates that yielded signicant coecient
estimates for the interactive transparency variable for the rst time. Both involved an expansion of
the swap program, the rst was the actual initiation of the program while the second expanded it
beyond the major central banks. The signicant coecient estimate obtained for the transparency
variable suggests that these expansions were of particular importance to countries with more opaque
US asset holdings.
4.4 Dierential Impacts for Swap Partner Countries
While the evidence above suggests that the broad cross section was aected by the international
swap arrangements, it seems likely that the principal countries directly involved in those swaps
may have been more aected on average. To investigate that possibility, we add slope dummies
for countries that were direct auction recipients. We add a variable directt 1 that takes value the
value of auction volume to country i times the average tenor of the securities auctioned at time
t   1 if country i received TAF funds in period t   1, and 0 otherwise to capture the additional
impact on CDS spreads of being a direct recipient of the TAF funds. We also add three interactive
variables to our base specication: Exposureit  directt 1 which interacts the exposure variables
with a variable directt 1, which takes the value of auction volume to country i times the average
tenor of the securities auctioned at time t   1 if country i received TAF funds in period t   1, and
0 otherwise, Transpit  directt 1, and Illiquidityit  directt 1. These allow the direct eect to vary
by country characteristics according to the predictions of the theory.
25The results are shown in Table 8. The directt 1 variable obtains a positive sign throughout,
but is insignicant at a 5% condence level. The slope coecients of the trade-related interactive
direct exposure variables are negative throughout, except for Model 5, but are only statistically
signicant in Models 6 and 7. We also obtain negative, but usually insignicant coecient estimates
for the direct interactive illiquidity variables, with the exceptions again being Models 6 and 7,
while the direct interactive transparency variable is insignicant throughout. The results for the
overall variables from our base specication are little changed by the inclusion of these direct
impact variables. In particular, the interactive exposure measures enter signicantly with their
predicted negative signs for al specications except Model 5. As a result, we conclude that the
international swaps did indeed serve to promote general dollar liquidity, and gave little measurable
special assistance to those countries who were the direct recipients of the funds.
Finally, we next turn to the countries explicitly named in announcements concerning changes
in the swap programs to examine if those countries exhibited additional sensitivity to country
characteristics relative to the non-partner countries. We run our specication for announcements
with the Exposureit, Transpit, and Illiquidityit variables interacted with two new variables major
and other. major is a dummy variable that takes value one for the "major central banks," namely
the ECB, the SNB, the BOE, the BOJ, and the Bank of Canada, on dates when they are specically
mentioned in Federal Reserve Announcements, and 0 otherwise, and take value 0 for the other
central banks in our sample throughout. Similarly, dummy variable other takes value one for the
other central banks in our sample on dates when they are specically mentioned in Federal Reserve
Announcements, and value 0 otherwise, and value 0 for the major central banks throughout. We
pool across these two groups of central banks because there are too few mentioned in any individual
announcement to obtain an estimate of any extra sensitivity directly-named countries might have
to these announcements. The cost of this aggregation is that we must constrain the coecients
to be identical across countries within these groups. We ran the specication including both the
announcement events and the actual auction data, with the new interactive terms added. To
26conserve on space, we only report the coecient estimates on the slope coecients, which can be
found in Table 9.33
The interactive exposure variables obtain negative coecient estimates throughout, both for
announcements involving major and other central banks. However, they are only statistically sig-
nicant half of the time. The interactive transparency variable for swap announcements concerning
major central banks is negative, and signicant in four of the seven specications. However, the co-
ecient for announcements concerning swap arrangements with other central banks, the interactive
transparency variable is universally positive and statistically signicant in six of the seven speci-
cations. This suggests that among the non-major central banks countries, there was additional
sensitivity to the opaqueness of US asset holdings among actual swap partners. Lastly, there was
little observable dierence in sensitivity to swap announcements by illiquidity among swap partner
countries, as our coecient estimates by this characteristic were mixed.
Overall, we did not observe much heterogeneity between the responsiveness of actual swap
partners and the other countries in our sample, suggesting that the swaps acted more as a general
injection of dollar liquidity worldwide than as funds that disproportionately assisted the countries
towards whom these swaps were targeted. However, one notable exception was the interactive
transparency variable for other central banks. Our previous results suggested that the September
24, 2008 announcement introducing swap lines to Australia, Denmark, Sweden and Norway dis-
proportionately beneted countries with more opaque US portfolios. Our results in this section
suggest that the swap partner countries were even more sensitive to asset opaqueness.
33The full specication can be found in appendix Table A5.
275 Conclusion
This paper argues that the appreciation of the U.S. dollar exhibited at the height of turbulence
during the recent global nancial crisis suggests that there was a global dollar shortage. Models
with illiquidity in dollar markets can mimic this behavior, as declines in some dollar asset values
{ as occurred to toxic US during the global nancial crisis such as mortgage-backed securities {
can result in the appreciation of other dollar assets that can serve as substitutes in the provision of
liquidity services. This includes currency, which is a potential explanation of the surprising dollar
exchange rate appreciation that occurred at the height of the global nancial crisis. These models
predict that injections of dollar liquidity, as occurred during the TAF auctions of the major foreign
central banks, will have a disproportionately benecial impact on economies that are more heavily
exposed to the United States through trade or nancial channels, have more opaque assets, or have
deeper illiquidity problems.
We take these predictions to a cross-country panel, examining the impact of the TAF auctions
on CDS spreads in a format that avoids a number of the problems encountered by the event
studies in the existing literature. Our results suggest that the benets of the TAF auctions were
disproportionately enjoyed by those countries that had greater trade or asset exposure to the United
States. We obtain weaker or incorrect results for national dierences in the impact of the auctions
by the transparency of dollar holdings and measures of illiquidity.
Looking at announcements concerning the TAF auctions, we found a discrepancy between
those announcements that came at the height of the nancial crisis and other announcements in
our sample. For announcements in October 2008, we obtained results that were similar to those
observed for the actual auctions throughout. In particular, we observed greater sensitivity to the
announcements among countries that had greater trade or nancial exposure to the United States.
In contrast, for two of the other three announcements, we observed greater sensitivity among
countries holding more opaque asset portfolios, again in keeping with the predictions of the theory.
28Overall, our results suggest that the swap arrangements disproportionately beneted those
countries that were more exposed to the United States, and we also obtain some evidence of
disproportionate benets to countries holding more opaque US asset portfolios. As suggested by
theory, this is what one would expect from an eective dollar liquidity injection. Our results
therefore support the claim that the swap arrangements provided tangible liquidity improvements.
However, we should stress that we make no claims about the welfare implications of the swap
arrangements here.
29References
Aizenman, J., and G. K. Pasricha (2010): \Selective Swap Arrangements and the Global
Financial Crisis:," International Review of Economics and Finance, 19(3), 353{365.
Baba, N., and F. Packer (2009a): \From Turmoil to Crisis: Dislocations in the FX Swap Market
Before and After the Failure of Lehman Brothers," Journal of International Money and Finance,
28, 1350{1374.
(2009b): \Interpreting Deviations from Covered Interest Parity During the Financial
Market Turmoil of 2007-2008," Journal of Banking and Finance, 33, 1953{1962.
Bernanke, B. S. (2009): \Four Questions About the Financial Crisis," Speech at the Morehouse
College, Atlanta Georgia.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009): \Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008," Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 23(1), 77{100.
Chinn, M., and J. A. Frankel (2007): \Will the Euro Eventually Surpass the Dollar as Lead-
ing International Reserve Currency?," in G7 Current Account Imbalances: Sustainability and
Adjustment, ed. by R. Clarida, pp. 283{335. NBER and University of Chicago Press.
Choi, H., and H. Varian (2009): \Predicting the Present with Google Trends," mimeo.
Da, Z., J. Engelberg, and P. Gao (2011): \In Search of Attention," forthcoming, Journal of
Finance.
D'Amico, S., and T. B. King (2011): \Flow and Stock Eects of Large Scale Treasury Pur-
chases," mimeo.
Engel, C. (2009): \Exchange Rate Policies," background paper for BIS conference "The Interna-
tional Financial Crisis and Policy Challenges in Asia and the Pacic," Shanghai, PRC, August,
2009.
Fratzscher, M. (2009): \What explains global exchange rate movements during the nancial
crisis?," Journal of International Money and Finance, 28, 1390{1407.
Geromichalos, A., and I. Simonovska (2010): \Asset Liquidity and Home Bias," mimeo.
Goldberg, L., and C. Tille (2008): \Vehicle Currency Use in International Trade," Journal of
International Economics, 76, 177{192.
Goldberg, L. S., C. Kennedy, and J. Miu (2010): \Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and
Overseas Dollar Funding Costs," Federal Reserve Bank of New York Sta Report no. 429.
Google (2011): \Google Insights for Search," http://www.google.com/insights/search/.
30Hale, G. B., and M. M. Spiegel (2008): \Who Drove the Boom in Euro-Denominated Bond
Issues?," Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Working Paper 08-20.
Hamilton, J. D., and C. Wu (2011): \The Eectiveness of Alternative Monetary Policy Tools
in a Zero Lower Bound Environment," mimeo.
Ho, C., and F.-L. Michaud (2008): \Central Bank Measures to Alleviate Foreign Currency
Funding Shortages," BIS Quarterly Review.
Hui, C.-H., H. Genberg, and T.-K. Chung (2010): \Funding Liquidity Risk and Deviations
from Interest-Rate Parity During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009," International Journal of
Finance and Economics, n/a, doi: 10.1002/ijfe.427.
Kholodin, K. A., M. Podstawski, and B. Siliverstovs (2010): \Do Google Searches Help in
Nowcasting Private Consumption?: A Real-Time Evidence for the US," Swiss Federal Institute
of Technology and Health.
Kiyotaki, N., and R. Wright (1993): \A Search-Theoretic Approach to Monetary Economics,"
American Economic Review, 83(1), 63{77.
Krishnamurthy, A., and A. Vissing-Jorgensen (2011): \The Eects of Quantitative Easing
on Interest Rates," mimeo.
Krugman, P. (2007): \Will there be a dollar crisis?," Economic Policy, 22(51), 435{67.
Lagos, R., and G. Rocheteau (2008): \Money and Capital as Competing Media of Exchange,"
Journal Economic Theory, 142(1), 247{258.
Lagos, R., and R. Wright (2005): \A Unied Framework for Monetary Theory and Policy
Analysis," Journal of Political Economy, 113(3), 463{484.
Lester, B., A. Postlewaite, and R. Wright (2009a): \Information and Liquidity,"
manuscript, University of Pennsylvania.
(2009b): \Information, Liquidity, Asst Prices and Monetary Policy," manuscript, Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania.
Liu, Q. (2010): \Goods Market Frictions and Real Exchange Rate Puzzles," mimeo.
McAndrews, J., A. Sarkar, and Z. Wang (2008): \The Eect of the Term Auction Facility
on the London Inter-Bank Oered Rate," FRBNY Sta Report no. 335.
McCauley, R. N., and P. McGuire (2009): \Dollar appreciation in 2008: safe haven, carry
trades, dollar shortage and overhedging," BIS Quarterly Review, pp. 85{93.
Mondria, J., T. Wu, and Y. Zhang (2010): \The Determinants of International Investment
and Attention Allocation," Journal of International Economics, 82, 85{95.
31Obstfeld, M., J. C. Shambaugh, and A. Taylor (2009): \Financial Instability, Reserves,
and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008," American Economic Review: Papers and
Proceedings, 99(2), 480{486.
Peter, G. v., and P. McGuire (2009): \The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking and the
International Policy Response," BIS Paper 291.
Rose, A. K., and M. M. Spiegel (2009a): \Cross-Country Causes and Consequences of the 2008
Crisis: Early Warning," NBER Working Paper no. 15358.
(2009b): \Cross-Country Causes and Consequences of the 2008 Crisis: International
Linkages and American Exposure," NBER Working Paper no. 15358.
(2011): \International Dollar Illiquidity and Central Bank Swap Arrangements," mimeo.
Taylor, J. B., and J. C. Williams (2008): \Further Results on a Black Swan in the Money
Market," mimeo.
(2009): \A Black Swan in the Money Market," American Economic Journal: Macroeco-
nomics, 1(1), 58{83.
Trejos, A., and R. Wright (1995): \Search, Bargaining, Money and Prices," Journal of Political
Economy, 103(1), 118{141.
Varian, H. R. (2010): \Computer Mediated Transactions," American Economic Review, 100(2),
1{10.
326 Appendix
This appendix summarizes the model in Rose and Spiegel (2011), an international version of the
search-based asset model of Lagos and Wright (2005), and its implications for the empirical speci-
cation in the paper. Detailed derivations of can be found in a technical appendix available online
at http://www.frbsf.org/economics/economists/mspiegel/wp11-18appendix.pdf.
There are two countries in the model, u and r, which can be interpreted as representing the
United States and the rest of the world with identical preferences and production technologies.
Country z has world output share of z;(z = u;r), where 0  z  1 and u = 1   r.
In each period a continuum of innitely lived agents participate in two distinct international
markets: One is a Walrasian centralized global market, and another is a decentralized market,
where pairs of buyers and sellers from the two countries are randomly matched. As in Lagos and
Wright (2005) transactions in the decentralized market are characterized by a double-coincidence
problem, which rules out barter, and anonymity, which rules out the provision of credit between
matched agents. A tangible medium of exchange is therefore required for transactions to take place.
On each date, agents from country z (z = u;r) can produce a tradable homogeneous good for
the centralized market, x, using labor, hz, according to the production function xz = hz. Utility is
assumed to be concave in x and negatively linear in h according to U(xz)   hz and U0(0) = 1, so
that x
z, the optimal production of x in each country satises U(x
z) = 1.
Agents also produce a good, qz, which is tradable in the international decentralized market.
qz is produced at disutility c(qz), where c0 > 0, c" > 0, and c(0) = c0(0) = 0. Agents value qz
according to the concave function (qz), where 0 > 0, " < 0, (0) = 0, and 0(0) = 1, so that
q
z, the optimal production of qz satises 0(qz) = c0(qz). To highlight the role that dierences in
information sets and asset illiquidity play in determining outcomes, we assume that both x and q
are homogeneous across countries.
Each country has a domestic money supply, which is in xed supply, and a real asset that
yields a dividend in the centralized market the following period. There are good and bad assets.
Bad assets yield a zero dividend, while good assets yield a dividend of z units of x; z = u;r. Bad
assets can be produced at zero cost.
Let z and  z represent the values of money and real assets of country z in the centralized
market in terms of x respectively. As in Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2009b), agents can
distinguish between bad and good assets in the centralized market, but in the decentralized market
only informed agents can. Sellers who do not know the value of an asset will refuse to accept it at
a positive price. As a result, bargaining only takes place where both agents are informed.
We focus on steady state equilibria. There is a xed supply of trees in each country, Az, and
the supplies of both currencies grow at a constant rate, z. Let b k represent the next period value
of any variable k, so that c Mz = zMz. Agents worldwide are assumed to share a common discount
factor, , and we assume that z > 1 >  for both countries.34.
34If allowed, agents may choose to keep some of their assets out of the bargaining process in the decentralized
33All assets owned by agents are assumed to be brought into the decentralized market. We also
assume that assets are "scarce," and therefore carry a liquidity value over their value in exchange
the following day in the centralized market. The conditions needed for this assumption to hold are
shown below.
Agents' centralized market portfolios are comprised of mz;u units of country u currency, mz;r
units of country r currency, az;u units of country u real assets, and az;r units of country r assets.
Let yz represent income of an agent from country z in the centralized market, which satises
yz = umz;u + rmz;r + (u +  r)az;u + (r +  r)az;r: (2)
Let W(yr) be the value function of an agent from country z in the centralized market, and
dene Vz(mz;u;mz;r;az;u;az;r) as the value function of an agent from country z in the decentralized
market with portfolio (mz;u;mz;r;az;u;az;r). An agent from country z solves
max
xz;hz;b mz;u;b mz;r;b az;u;b az;r
W(yz) = fU(xz)   hz + Vz;u(b mz;u; b mz;r;b az;u;b az;r)g (3)
subject to
xz  hz + yz   u b mz;u   r b mz;r    u(b az;u)    r(b az;r) + Tz; (4)
where Tz is a lump-sum transfer returned to private agents in country z from revenues generated
by money creation, Tz = (z   1)Mz. We demonstrate in Rose and Spiegel (2011) that yz does
not enter into the rst order conditions. This is the mechanism through which the degenerate
portfolio solutions are recovered each time the agents return to the centralized market in the
Lagos and Wright (2005) framework. There are also four asset market clearing conditions, as the
representative agent from each country holds his country's share of each asset.
In the decentralized market, agents are randomly paired into bilateral meetings. Let z and k
represent the countries of origin of the buyer and seller respectively in the decentralized market
(z;k = u;r). To allow for international liquidity dierences we assume that sellers in the decen-
tralized market only accept assets denominated in their domestic currencies. The probability of
landing in a meeting in which there is a coincidence of wants is exogenous, but is proportional to
the share of output of country k, k, and is greater among agents originating from the same country
by an exogenous parameter  > 1. Let z;k represent the probability that an agent from z is paired
with an agent from k from whom he wants to buy, and e z;k represent the chance that an agent from
z is paired with an agent from country k to whom he wants to sell. We assume that z;k  k
when z 6= k and z;k  k when z = k, and that e z;k  e k when z 6= k and e z;k  e k when
z = k, where  and e  are exogenous constants.
All agents from country k are informed about the value of their domestic currency, but only
market [Lagos and Rocheteau (2008)]. We rule this out for simplicity
34a fraction k are informed about the value of ak. We label meetings where the seller is informed
about ak "type 2," and meetings where the seller is uninformed "type 1." The type of meeting that
is taking place is known to all.
Consider a type n meeting (n = 1;2) where there is a coincidence of wants between a buyer
from country z and a seller from country k. Let pz;k;n represent the price paid by the buyer from
country z to a seller from country k for qz;k;n units of the good, and let yz and yk represent the
wealth of the buyer and the seller respectively. Finally, let !z;k;n be the value of acceptable funds
possessed by the buyer, i.e. those recognized by the seller and denominated in the seller's domestic
currency. Given our assumptions above, !z;k;1 = kmz;k, and !z;k;2 = kmz;k + ( k + k)az;k.
Assuming that the buyer has bargaining power  and threat points are given by continuation
values, the generalized Nash bargaining solution is similar to that in Lagos and Wright (2005):
max
qz;k;n;pz;k;n
[[(qz;k;n) + W(yz   pz;k;n)]   Wz(yz)][[ c(qz;k;n) + W(yk + pz;k;n)]   W(yk)]1  (5)
subject to pz;k;n  !z;k;n.
The rst order conditions satisfy
pz;k;n =
0(qz;k;n)c(qz;k;n) + (1   )(qz;k;n)c0(qz;k;n)
0(qz;k;n) + (1   )c0(qz;k;n)
 (qz;k;n); (6)
and
 [ c(qz;k;n)+pz;k;n]+(1 )[(qz;k;n) pz;k;n] '[ c(qz;k;n)+pz;k;n][(qz;k;n) pz;k;n](1 ) = 0: (7)
We assume that we are in the case where the liquidity constraint is binding, which implies that
pz;k;n = !z;k;n and qz;k;n satises 6 for pz;k;n = !z;k;n. Note that the terms of trade only depend
on the buyer's portfolio.




[u;n[(qz;u;n) + W(yz   pz;u;n)] + r;n[(qz;r;n) + W(yz   pz;r;n)]]+(1 )W(yz)+	k (8)
where k;1 = k(1   k);k;2 = kk, and 	k represents the extra utility of an agent from country
k associated with being a seller relative to having no trade opportunities.
Let e qz;k;n and e pz;k;n represent the volume and proceeds of selling q to an agent from country
35z. 	k satises
	k = fe i[ c(e qi;k;1)+e pi;k;1]+e j[ c(e qj;k;1)+e pj;k;1]g(1 k)+fe i[ c(e qi;k;2)+e pi;k;2]+e j[ c(e qj;k;2)+e pj;k;2]gk
(9)
where k is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if agent k is informed about ak, and 0 otherwise.
It can be easily seen that 	k is invariant to the portfolio decision of the agent from country k.
We follow Lagos and Wright (2005) in dening `(qz;k;n)  [0(qz;k;n)=0(qz;k;n)]   1 as the
liquidity premium in a type n meeting with a buyer from country z and a seller from country k.
`(qz;k;n) represents the increase in the buyer's utility from bringing an additional unit of country
k currency into a type n meeting above its value in the next centralized market. We also follow
Lagos and Wright (2005) in assuming that `0(qz;k;n)  0, which holds under usual conditions.
Dierentiating Vz and combining the results with the centralized market solution conditions
yields individual agents' demand for currencies u and r, as well as assets  u and  r. Equilibrium is
dened as a solution for asset holdings, asset prices, the terms of trade in the decentralized markets,
and leisure choices that satisfy the maximization conditions of each agent, the bargaining solutions
in the decentralized markets, and market clearing in the centralized market. In the steady state,
real variables are constant over time, and z and Mz grow at a constant rate z (z = u;r). The
steady state versions of the money and asset demand equations satisfy
   
u
 (1   u)`(qz;u;1) + u`(qu;2); (10)
   
r
 (1   r)`(qz;r;1) + r`(qr;2); (11)
(1   ) u   u
( u + u)u
= u`(qz;u;2); (12)
and
(1   ) r   r
( r + r)r
= r`(qz;r;2); (13)
where the conditions hold with equality when positive levels of money or assets are held. Existence
and uniqueness of the equilibrium is demonstrated in Rose and Spiegel (2011).
We next examine the comparative static impact of a decline in u. First by equation 12, the




u   ( u + u)uu`0(qz;u;2)If!z;u;2 < (q)g
 u   ( u + u)uu`0(qz;u;2)If!z;u;2 < (q)g
: (14)
36The numerator of equation 14 is unambiguously positive, but the denominator is ambiguous
in sign. The necessary condition for @ u=@u  0 is that `0(qz;u;2) is not "too large". We require
the restriction  u  ( u + u)uu`0(qz;u;2)If!z;u;2 < (q)g, which implies that asset values fall
with declines in their dividend streams, which we adopt.
Substituting from equation 12 into equation 10 and totally dierentiating with respect to




 u + u
@ u
@u




@u can be signed as positive given the restriction above.
In contrast, it can be seen by inspection of equations 13 and 11 that  r and rmz;r are
invariant to changes in u. This implies that a decline in u will lead to an appreciation in country
u's exchange rate, u=r.
A formal proof is in Rose and Spiegel (2011). Intuitively, as mz;u is exogenous, any change in
real balances, umz;u must come from an increase in u. In contrast, since rmz;r is unchanged r
must be unchanged as well.
We next turn to our empirical work by assessing the implications of our model for the predicted
impact of the U.S. dollar auctions by foreign central banks. We assume that dollar injections are
surprise interventions that take place in the decentralized market subsequent to the fall in u. As
was the case empirically, the dollar injections are assumed to be loans which for tractability we
assume are repaid in the next entry into the centralized market.
The impact of the liquidity injection on an agent from a foreign country can then be represented
in terms of the change in the decentralized market value function with an increase in US currency
holdings. The inuence of country characteristics on the relative impact of the injections can then
be shown in terms of the cross-partials of the decentralized market value function with respect to
dollar holdings and these characteristics. We examine three: r;u, u, and `(qr;u;1). By equation
8, @2Vr=@mr;u@r;u, @2Vr=@mr;u@u and @2Vr=@mr;u@`(qr;u;1) satisfy
@2Vr
@mr;u@r;u
= u[(1   u)`(qr;u;1)Ir;u;1 + u`(qr;u;2)Ir;u;2]  0; (16)
@2Vr
@mr;u@u




= ur;u;1Ir;u;1 > 0: (18)
37Our interpretation is of these results is discussed in the text.
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8/1/2008 = 100; (right axis)
Sources: Bloomberg and Federal Reserve DistFAME
VIX and VSTOXX indicies of equity market volatility in United States and
European exchanges respectively. Daily frequency.
Dollar-euro exchange rate indexed to 100 on August 1, 2008.
39Figure 2: Weekly Major Central Bank TAF Auction Volumes
Source: Board of Governors




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































41Table 1: Announcements concerning international swap arrangements: 2007-2008
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
42Table 2: TAF Auctions by major central banks
Quarter
ECB BOE BOJ SNB
Dollars Average Dollars Average Dollars Average Dollars Average
Auctioned Tenor Auctioned Tenor Auctioned Tenor Auctioned Tenor
(Millions) (Days) (Millions) (Days) (Millions) (Days) (Millions) (Days)
2007q4 20000 31.5 - - - - 4000 28.0
2008q1 35000 28.0 - - - - 10000 28.0
2008q2 130000 28.0 - - - - 30000 28.0
2008q3 589742 11.3 216044 2.1 29622 28.0 132139 11.8
2008q4 3608841 8.3 667737 9.7 205635 54.2 196948 11.3
2009q1 1937722 7.4 30956 50.6 106253 59.1 51702 20.0
2009q2 865642 9.5 3503 59.7 36243 49.4 41006 18.7
2009q3 542729 7.5 538 26.4 8100 31.5 18 28.0
2009q4 259478 7.5 52 7.0 1300 32.4 - -
2010q1 6575 7.0 - - 100 29.0 - -
Source: Federal Reserve Board of Governors
Notes: Size (millions of dollars) and average tenor (days) of dollar auctions
by major central banks.
43Table 3: Google searches and sovereign ratings
I. Full Sample: January 2004-September 2010
Rating Coecient T-stat # of Obs # of Countries R-squared
Local LT -0.04** -4.0 5360 100 0.07
Foreign LT -0.01** -5.15 5410 99 0.04
Foreign ST -0.05** -4.73 5363 98 0.09
II. Study Sample: December 2007-December 2009
Rating Coecient T-stat # of Obs # of Countries R-squared
Local LT -0.04** -9.7 2245 96 0.15
Foreign LT -0.02** -11.56 2270 96 0.08
Foreign ST -0.06** -10.81 2260 96 0.22
Regression of Fitch Ratings changes on changes in Google Index
Source: Google Insight for Search, Fitch
OLS panel estimation with country and time xed eects included.
Monthly data with robust standard errors.
44Table 4: Base specication
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposureauction -2.87 -2.56 -3.14 -0.64 -0.01 -0.66 -0.68
(-2.15) (-4.94) (-2.95) (-3.99) (-1.42) (-3.50) (-3.62)
Transpauction -0.58 -0.61 -0.54 -0.58 -0.54 -0.74 -0.75
(-2.10) (-2.65) (-2.14) (-2.43) (-2.19) (-3.26) (-3.27)
Illiquidauction 1.64 0.68 0.81 0.94 0.51 0.89 0.94
(1.04) (1.25) (1.22) (1.80) (0.66) (1.46) (1.53)
ExposureSP500 -6.97 -6.05 -8.16 -1.85 -0.03 -2.00 -1.98
(-5.20) (-4.58) (-6.20) (-21.05) (-4.87) (-15.37) (-14.61)
Default 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.61 1.51 0.66 0.67
(0.52) (0.76) (0.43) (0.85) (2.11) (0.91) (0.93)
Num of Obs 4005 4005 4005 4005 3607 4005 4005
R2 0.200 0.200 0.212 0.240 0.209 0.217 0.216
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
45Table 5: Alternative illiquidity measures
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
I. Illiquidity proxied by ST Debt/GDP
Exposureauction -2.66 -2.57 -3.19 -0.63 -0.01 -0.64 -0.66
(-2.42) (-4.90) (-2.88) (-3.96) (-1.45) (-3.55) (-3.66)
Transpauction -0.57 -0.59 -0.52 -0.56 -0.53 -0.72 -0.72
(-2.08) (-2.62) (-2.06) (-2.39) (-2.14) (-3.24) (-3.25)
ill gdpauction 0.59 0.32 0.56 0.35 0.32 0.26 0.23
(1.16) (1.20) (1.46) (1.14) (0.91) (1.00) (0.88)
II. Illiquidity proxied by ST Debt/Reserves
Exposureauction -2.60 -2.55 -3.14 -0.62 -0.01 -0.64 -0.66
(-2.51) (-4.94) (-2.92) (-3.91) (-1.46) (-3.52) (-3.63)
Transpauction -0.58 -0.59 -0.53 -0.57 -0.54 -0.73 -0.73
(-2.12) (-2.66) (-2.09) (-2.42) (-2.18) (-3.27) (-3.28)
ill resauction 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.00 -0.01
(0.85) (0.22) (0.95) (0.02) (0.44) (-0.02) (-0.12)
III. Illiquidity proxied by Greenspan-Guidotti measure
Exposureauction -2.18 -2.09 -2.49 -0.44 -0.01 -0.35 -0.39
(-2.13) (-4.04) (-2.23) (-2.16) (-1.03) (-1.19) (-1.40)
Transpauction -0.18 -0.24 -0.20 -0.26 -0.18 -0.20 -0.24
(-0.57) (-0.74) (-0.65) (-0.72) (-0.51) (-0.43) (-0.54)
ill GGauction 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.40 0.37
(1.75) (1.51) (1.51) (1.14) (1.46) (1.27) (1.23)
Coecients for ill gdp are presented in millions
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
46Table 6: OECD countries only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposureauction -6.53 -2.42 -4.87 -0.96 -0.01 -1.00 -0.93
(-2.76) (-3.19) (-3.44) (-3.63) (-2.08) (-4.09) (-3.83)
Transpauction -0.01 -0.22 -0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.31 -0.33
(-0.04) (-0.75) (-0.16) (-0.48) (-0.33) (-1.12) (-1.18)
Illiquidauction 5.20 1.14 3.45 1.45 1.55 0.76 0.50
(2.02) (1.05) (2.43) (1.60) (1.15) (0.77) (0.49)
ExposureSP500 -10.98 -4.79 -8.75 -2.05 -0.04 -2.32 -2.08
(-5.07) (-3.72) (-5.78) (-8.34) (-5.58) (-5.37) (-4.91)
Default 2.60 2.56 2.53 2.93 2.66 2.79 2.80
(4.00) (4.15) (4.04) (5.06) (4.31) (4.58) (4.59)
Num of Obs 2220 2220 2220 2220 2220 2220 2220
R2 0.188 0.184 0.195 0.197 0.200 0.186 0.182
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
47Table 7a: Swap announcements with major central banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
I. Dec 12 '07: Lines introduced with ECB and SNB
Exposure -14.76 5.18 -3.48 -2.69 0.01 -0.56 -0.91
(-1.62) (0.66) (-0.37) (-0.87) (0.25) (-0.19) (-0.30)
Transp 18.21 14.85 15.46 17.52 14.30 17.83 18.14
(3.33) (2.85) (2.89) (3.30) (2.56) (3.47) (3.49)
Illiquid -33.20 -22.12 -23.45 -27.81 -30.93 -41.52 -39.76
(-1.52) (-2.02) (-1.91) (-1.49) (-3.05) (-2.60) (-2.39)
II. Sep 18 '08: Lines introduced with BOJ, BOE, and Bank of Canada
Exposure -3.40 -25.09 -18.37 -8.66 -0.12 -7.65 -8.33
(-0.10) (-1.36) (-0.61) (-1.74) (-1.06) (-1.29) (-1.41)
Transp -14.05 -11.44 -11.02 -6.54 -9.07 -10.62 -10.72
(-2.34) (-2.12) (-1.92) (-0.99) (-1.40) (-1.78) (-1.81)
Illiquid -50.36 -55.20 -51.05 -24.06 -35.95 -19.98 -18.84
(-0.91) (-1.76) (-1.62) (-0.59) (-0.94) (-0.43) (-0.39)
III. Oct 13 '08:Unlimited swaps with ECB, BOE, BOJ, and SNB
Exposure -85.29 -80.45 -102.39 -14.05 -0.05 -17.45 -17.99
(-4.50) (-5.04) (-5.56) (-2.22) (-0.13) (-2.51) (-2.64)
Transp -25.29 -24.10 -21.22 -31.06 -30.52 -37.98 -38.17
(-3.15) (-3.13) (-2.70) (-3.84) (-2.57) (-4.89) (-4.92)
Illiquid 65.14 -51.83 -25.54 -36.31 -71.59 -16.50 -16.55
(1.76) (-1.65) (-0.60) (-1.30) (-1.08) (-0.47) (-0.46)
Num of Obs 4000 4000 4000 4000 3601 4000 4000
R2 0.309 0.313 0.319 0.356 0.318 0.343 0.343
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
Major central banks include: European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and Bank of Canada.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01 48Table 7b: Swap announcements with other central banks
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
I. Sep 24 '08:
Lines introduced with Australia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway
Exposure -42.89 -39.94 -42.76 -7.40 -0.39 5.79 4.94
(-1.24) (-1.15) (-1.26) (-0.75) (-2.07) (0.58) (0.49)
Transp 97.17 96.36 97.26 96.73 108.09 90.89 91.06
(4.99) (5.02) (4.97) (4.83) (5.21) (5.09) (5.11)
Illiquid 88.06 61.04 64.72 64.69 106.20 5.76 10.83
(0.26) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.31) (0.02) (0.03)
II. Oct 28 '08:
Lines introduced with New Zealand, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Singapore
Exposure -73.09 -74.99 -94.30 -44.46 -0.29 -46.21 -46.03
(-1.62) (-3.54) (-2.85) (-8.11) (-1.10) (-6.79) (-6.69)
Transp -71.79 -69.06 -63.61 -50.05 -60.96 -75.93 -76.98
(-6.44) (-6.18) (-5.94) (-7.43) (-4.23) (-8.54) (-8.72)
Illiquid 67.53 -133.56 -85.45 34.15 -75.38 81.06 71.73
(0.52) (-2.09) (-1.24) (0.52) (-0.86) (0.85) (0.69)
Num of Obs 4000 4000 4000 4000 3601 4000 4000
R2 0.309 0.313 0.319 0.356 0.318 0.343 0.343
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
Other central banks include: Reserve Bank of Australia, Danmarks Nationalbank,
Bank of Korea, Bank of Mexico, Norges Bank, Sveriges Riksbank.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
49Table 8: Base with direct auction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
direct 1.78 1.81 1.77 1.49 1.91 1.67 1.76
(1.81) (1.90) (1.82) (1.49) (2.01) (1.67) (1.77)
Exposureauction -2.82 -2.62 -3.15 -0.68 -0.01 -0.63 -0.65
(-2.08) (-5.22) (-2.92) (-3.86) (-1.54) (-3.17) (-3.27)
Exposuredir -4.70 -17.02 -16.26 -1.73 0.01 -1.46 -1.41
(-0.24) (-1.84) (-0.97) (-1.34) (0.10) (-2.74) (-2.84)
Transpauction -0.39 -0.42 -0.35 -0.34 -0.32 -0.58 -0.58
(-1.23) (-1.50) (-1.17) (-1.03) (-0.97) (-2.07) (-2.08)
Transpdir -0.33 0.08 0.19 -1.00 -0.74 -0.70 -0.72
(-0.21) (0.09) (0.14) (-1.24) (-0.65) (-1.00) (-1.03)
Illiquidauction 1.26 0.33 0.44 0.56 0.33 0.48 0.53
(0.79) (0.50) (0.59) (0.93) (0.40) (0.73) (0.80)
Illiquiddir -254.49 -103.10 -132.89 -150.13 -282.19 -198.59 -200.98
(-1.72) (-1.09) (-0.95) (-1.61) (-1.59) (-2.71) (-2.75)
ExposureSP500 -6.97 -6.03 -8.16 -1.85 -0.03 -1.99 -1.98
(-5.20) (-4.57) (-6.19) (-21.01) (-4.86) (-15.35) (-14.60)
Default 0.35 0.48 0.28 0.61 1.50 0.66 0.67
(0.51) (0.76) (0.43) (0.85) (2.08) (0.90) (0.92)
Num of Obs 4005 4005 4005 4005 3607 4005 4005
R2 0.201 0.201 0.213 0.241 0.210 0.218 0.217
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
50Table 9: Slope coecients for recipients in announcements
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposuremajor -0.23 -3.93 -1.02 -0.61 -0.01 -0.50 -0.49
(-0.43) (-4.91) (-0.97) (-3.27) (-1.99) (-5.73) (-5.55)
Transpmajor -0.09 -0.23 -0.06 -0.39 -0.05 -0.47 -0.47
(-0.68) (-2.99) (-0.49) (-2.27) (-0.40) (-3.28) (-3.17)
Illiquidmajor -21.87 -2.93 -17.83 2.74 0.44 -21.73 -22.10
(-3.57) (-0.29) (-2.57) (0.27) (0.03) (-5.48) (-5.57)
Exposureother -6.89 -0.42 -1.67 -1.16 0.02 2.39 0.05
(-2.20) (-0.79) (-1.87) (-6.95) (1.21) (3.88) (0.03)
Transpother 2.01 2.00 2.69 1.29 3.00 5.44 2.91
(2.93) (15.65) (20.61) (3.86) (7.63) (6.53) (1.61)
Illiquidother -34.07 146.83 134.03 49.01 -25.10 -135.02 58.81
(-0.93) (2.08) (2.56) (2.57) (-0.35) (-3.42) (0.51)
Num of Obs 4000 4000 4000 4000 3601 4000 4000
R2 0.232 0.230 0.242 0.269 0.240 0.246 0.244
Coecients in table are presented in hundreds
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
Major central banks include:
European Central Bank, Swiss National Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, and Bank of Canada.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
51Table A1: Add Level Eects to Interaction Terms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
ExposureXauction -2.52 -2.49 -3.00 -0.63 -0.01 -0.68 -0.69
(-2.01) (-4.90) (-2.95) (-3.98) (-1.35) (-3.70) (-3.86)
TranspXauction -0.61 -0.61 -0.55 -0.59 -0.56 -0.74 -0.74
(-2.25) (-2.64) (-2.19) (-2.52) (-2.27) (-3.20) (-3.25)
IlliquidXauction 0.63 -0.13 0.13 0.31 -0.27 0.35 0.41
(0.37) (-0.19) (0.16) (0.51) (-0.28) (0.48) (0.55)
Exposure -4.52 -6.91 -7.60 10.44 0.05 2.55 2.24
(-1.46) (-0.87) (-1.01) (1.98) (0.98) (2.50) (2.13)
Transp 1.78 2.49 1.82 2.60 4.90 5.01 3.94
(0.66) (0.88) (0.67) (0.79) (1.78) (1.33) (1.23)
Illiquid 14.24 15.24 12.63 13.65 15.14 11.42 11.17
(2.10) (2.61) (2.26) (1.53) (2.04) (1.75) (1.61)
ExposureXSP500 -6.99 -6.05 -8.17 -1.85 -0.03 -2.00 -1.98
(-5.21) (-4.58) (-6.19) (-20.91) (-4.88) (-15.31) (-14.59)
Chg Default 0.37 0.48 0.29 0.61 1.52 0.66 0.67
(0.53) (0.76) (0.44) (0.85) (2.12) (0.91) (0.92)
N 4000 4000 4000 4000 3601 4000 4000
R2 0.201 0.200 0.212 0.241 0.209 0.217 0.216
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
52Table A2: Base specication without time dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
auction 0.38 0.49 0.43 0.25 0.32 -0.04 0.05
(1.69) (2.26) (1.72) (0.91) (1.21) (-0.10) (0.14)
Exposureauction -1.54 -2.49 -2.34 -0.29 -0.00 -0.01 -0.10
(-1.30) (-3.89) (-1.68) (-1.52) (-0.88) (-0.02) (-0.27)
Transpauction -0.26 -0.33 -0.30 -0.14 -0.27 0.26 0.15
(-0.63) (-0.83) (-0.72) (-0.32) (-0.57) (0.43) (0.27)
Illiquidauction -1.53 -0.29 -0.49 -0.80 -0.76 -1.52 -1.32
(-1.03) (-0.39) (-0.62) (-0.79) (-0.80) (-0.91) (-0.85)
ExposureSP500 -8.82 -7.59 -10.05 -2.17 -0.04 -2.44 -2.43
(-5.75) (-4.62) (-6.72) (-22.59) (-5.54) (-16.93) (-16.09)
Default 0.65 0.79 0.54 0.90 2.19 1.01 1.02
(0.68) (0.88) (0.60) (0.94) (2.43) (1.01) (1.02)
Num of Obs 4005 4005 4005 4005 3607 4005 4005
R2 0.108 0.106 0.126 0.164 0.122 0.130 0.129
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
53Table A3: Single Word Google Search Results, Foreign Long-Term Debt
Word Coe T-stat R-sq # of countries # of obs
arrears 0.00263 0.63969 0.00007 4 89
balance -0.00804 -0.78951 0.00037 73 3103
bankruptcy 0.00482 0.34133 0.00010 48 1081
bond -0.03614 -1.37083 0.00767 83 3342
collapse -0.00289 -1.01006 0.00030 56 1140
contraction - - - 5 77
credit -0.04056 -1.14338 0.00494 100 4705
crisis -0.01548** -30.78583 0.07466 96 3779
currency -0.01646 -1.11072 0.00107 105 6703
danger -0.00613 -1.33332 0.00079 52 1352
debt -0.01316 -1.15926 0.00142 82 2866
decit 0.01410 1.15733 0.00159 56 1443
depression 0.00430 0.38199 0.00012 55 1814
disaster -0.00028 -0.35360 0.00000 68 2321
downturn 0.00212 0.88936 0.00002 10 159
equity -0.00429 -1.03095 0.00015 67 2694
exposure -0.01607 -0.71277 0.00163 34 769
failure -0.01601 -0.53411 0.00175 62 2014
nancial -0.06121* -2.26033 0.03905 100 4910
freeze -0.02815** -3.51057 0.00332 43 807
insolvency 0.00227 0.89918 0.00004 15 356
liability -0.00110 -0.07959 0.00000 41 1136
liquidity 0.01442 1.23534 0.00092 16 332
market -0.03413 -1.07742 0.00426 104 5908
overdue - - - 2 33
recession 0.00103 0.28506 0.00002 55 910
risk -0.01965 -1.01747 0.00172 86 3503
safety -0.01318 -1.24273 0.00058 93 4365
shortage -0.00072 -0.27161 0.00002 42 1005
stock -0.04151 -1.52674 0.02512 97 5093
tax -0.01440 -1.00984 0.00067 101 5635
unpaid -0.01309 -1.27611 0.00037 13 230
OLS estimation with robust standard errors.
54Table A4: Base specication with weekly time dummies
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposureauction -0.34 -0.84 -0.79 -0.05 0.00 0.26 0.15
(-0.28) (-1.67) (-0.65) (-0.25) (0.30) (0.77) (0.48)
Transpauction -0.13 -0.16 -0.16 -0.09 -0.11 0.27 0.15
(-0.36) (-0.46) (-0.45) (-0.22) (-0.27) (0.49) (0.30)
Illiquidauction 0.77 0.30 0.41 0.22 0.27 -0.33 -0.14
(0.52) (0.44) (0.53) (0.30) (0.32) (-0.26) (-0.13)
ExposureSP500 0.22 -0.47 -0.08 -0.44 0.00 -0.37 -0.41
(0.24) (-0.74) (-0.07) (-3.05) (0.54) (-2.22) (-2.56)
Chg Default -0.08 -0.11 -0.09 -0.09 0.49 -0.08 -0.08
(-0.19) (-0.25) (-0.23) (-0.20) (1.00) (-0.19) (-0.19)
Num of Obs 4005 4005 4005 4005 3607 4005 4005
R2 0.522 0.522 0.522 0.524 0.534 0.523 0.524
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, weekly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
55Table A5: Google default proxy generated from ad hoc word list
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
ExposureXauction -2.84 -2.62 -3.20 -0.66 -0.01 -0.70 -0.72
(-2.13) (-4.82) (-3.00) (-4.29) (-1.50) (-3.93) (-4.03)
TranspXauction -0.55 -0.57 -0.51 -0.54 -0.50 -0.72 -0.72
(-2.02) (-2.51) (-2.02) (-2.29) (-2.02) (-3.18) (-3.19)
IlliquidXauction 1.57 0.66 0.80 1.00 0.51 1.00 1.05
(0.99) (1.22) (1.19) (1.94) (0.65) (1.70) (1.77)
ExposureXSP500 -6.97 -6.04 -8.13 -1.79 -0.03 -1.94 -1.92
(-5.22) (-4.63) (-6.26) (-17.85) (-5.03) (-14.40) (-13.63)
chg google old 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01
(1.05) (1.38) (1.00) (1.29) (3.17) (1.36) (1.37)
N 4223 4223 4223 4223 3813 4223 4223
R2 0.202 0.201 0.213 0.239 0.210 0.217 0.216
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
56Table A6: Exposure as share of GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
ExposureXauction -3.79 -10.76 -4.13 -0.87 -0.26 -0.44 -0.75
(-2.00) (-5.45) (-2.39) (-2.48) (-1.42) (-1.44) (-1.47)
TranspXauction -0.68 -0.44 -0.50 -0.77 -0.72 -0.73 -0.70
(-2.82) (-1.88) (-2.03) (-3.38) (-3.22) (-3.22) (-3.07)
IlliquidXauction 0.19 3.35 1.15 2.06 0.28 0.53 0.64
(0.39) (2.22) (1.26) (1.77) (0.41) (0.79) (0.89)
ExposureXSP500 -17.25 -19.61 -12.19 -2.00 -1.43 -1.75 -2.89
(-3.61) (-4.17) (-5.50) (-3.18) (-2.39) (-2.40) (-2.35)
Chg Default 0.52 0.70 0.52 0.86 1.83 1.84 1.84
(0.72) (1.02) (0.72) (1.28) (3.04) (3.04) (3.04)
N 3953 3953 3953 3953 3555 3542 3465
R2 0.185 0.202 0.210 0.173 0.162 0.160 0.163
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
57Table A7: BIS Bank Exposure Measure
(1) (2)













t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
58Table A8: Euro area aggregated into one country
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
ExposureXauction -2.91 -2.62 -3.25 -0.69 -0.01 -0.69 -0.71
(-2.17) (-5.03) (-2.99) (-3.81) (-1.39) (-3.38) (-3.49)
TranspXauction -0.70 -0.71 -0.64 -0.64 -0.64 -0.87 -0.87
(-2.12) (-2.58) (-2.09) (-2.10) (-2.06) (-3.14) (-3.16)
IlliquidXauction 1.68 0.59 0.74 0.91 0.60 0.86 0.91
(1.07) (1.01) (1.14) (1.55) (0.75) (1.24) (1.29)
ExposureXSP500 -6.75 -5.92 -7.97 -1.90 -0.03 -2.09 -2.07
(-5.15) (-4.65) (-6.21) (-21.48) (-4.82) (-16.40) (-15.54)
Chg Default 0.24 0.36 0.15 0.46 1.43 0.50 0.52
(0.34) (0.56) (0.23) (0.64) (1.86) (0.69) (0.71)
N 3258 3258 3258 3258 2860 3258 3258
R2 0.217 0.218 0.232 0.277 0.231 0.247 0.246
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
59Table A9: Changes in Exchange Rates added as independent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
pct fx 0.27 0.14 0.17 -0.10 0.18 0.07 0.05
(0.83) (0.45) (0.54) (-0.32) (0.58) (0.24) (0.18)
ExposureXauction -2.71 -2.50 -3.03 -0.64 -0.01 -0.65 -0.68
(-1.95) (-4.83) (-2.67) (-3.95) (-1.31) (-3.48) (-3.61)
TranspXauction -0.61 -0.63 -0.57 -0.58 -0.57 -0.75 -0.75
(-2.14) (-2.71) (-2.15) (-2.37) (-2.25) (-3.23) (-3.24)
IlliquidXauction 1.48 0.68 0.80 0.90 0.48 0.88 0.93
(0.91) (1.23) (1.19) (1.68) (0.61) (1.42) (1.50)
ExposureXSP500 -6.95 -5.99 -8.11 -1.87 -0.03 -2.00 -1.99
(-5.22) (-4.49) (-6.15) (-18.51) (-4.84) (-14.38) (-13.57)
Chg Default 0.36 0.49 0.29 0.60 1.52 0.66 0.67
(0.52) (0.76) (0.43) (0.84) (2.08) (0.90) (0.92)
N 3991 3991 3991 3991 3600 3991 3991
R2 0.202 0.200 0.213 0.241 0.209 0.217 0.217
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
60Table A10: Changes in Exchange Rates as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
ExposureXauction -0.13 -0.05 -0.10 -0.03 -0.00 -0.03 -0.04
(-1.62) (-0.65) (-0.85) (-1.11) (-1.64) (-1.28) (-1.49)
TranspXauction 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.02 0.02
(0.59) (0.37) (0.52) (0.61) (1.18) (0.49) (0.54)
IlliquidXauction -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(-2.02) (-2.71) (-1.98) (-2.65) (-0.15) (-2.66) (-2.38)
ExposureXSP500 -0.11 -0.29 -0.28 -0.11 -0.00 -0.09 -0.09
(-1.25) (-2.86) (-2.03) (-3.87) (-1.25) (-2.75) (-2.15)
Chg Default -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01
(-0.17) (-0.32) (-0.37) (-0.42) (-0.64) (-0.28) (-0.25)
N 5778 5778 5778 5778 4897 5778 5778
R2 0.012 0.022 0.017 0.035 0.015 0.022 0.021
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
61Table A11: LIBOR-OIS Spreads as dependent variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
ExposureXauction -0.61 -0.03 -0.14 -0.10 -0.00 -0.06 -0.07
(-1.49) (-0.67) (-1.00) (-2.51) (-1.50) (-2.33) (-1.73)
TranspXauction 0.03 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.00
(1.12) (-0.34) (0.11) (0.42) (0.40) (-0.20) (0.03)
IlliquidXauction 6.55 3.90 4.32 6.59 4.43 4.95 5.15
(1.59) (1.32) (1.44) (2.25) (2.00) (1.77) (1.84)
ExposureXSP500 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.00 -0.04 -0.03
(-0.96) (-2.36) (-1.82) (-2.56) (-2.27) (-2.47) (-2.31)
Chg Default 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
(1.73) (1.70) (1.71) (1.68) (1.68) (1.67) (1.68)
N 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154 1154
R2 0.072 0.067 0.067 0.077 0.068 0.074 0.075
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
62Table A12: Illiquidity proxied by ST Debt/GDP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposureauction -2.66 -2.57 -3.19 -0.63 -0.01 -0.64 -0.66
(-2.42) (-4.90) (-2.88) (-3.96) (-1.45) (-3.55) (-3.66)
Transpauction -0.57 -0.59 -0.52 -0.56 -0.53 -0.72 -0.72
(-2.08) (-2.62) (-2.06) (-2.39) (-2.14) (-3.24) (-3.25)
ill gdpauction 0.60 0.33 0.57 0.35 0.32 0.26 0.23
(1.16) (1.20) (1.46) (1.14) (0.91) (1.00) (0.88)
ExposureSP500 -6.96 -6.03 -8.14 -1.85 -0.03 -1.99 -1.98
(-5.16) (-4.58) (-6.18) (-20.98) (-4.86) (-15.33) (-14.56)
Chg Default 0.36 0.49 0.29 0.61 1.52 0.66 0.68
(0.52) (0.77) (0.43) (0.86) (2.12) (0.91) (0.93)
Num of Obs 3953 3953 3953 3953 3555 3953 3953
R2 0.200 0.200 0.212 0.240 0.209 0.216 0.216
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
63Table A13: Illiquidity proxied by ST Debt/Reserves
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposureauction -2.60 -2.55 -3.14 -0.62 -0.01 -0.64 -0.66
(-2.51) (-4.94) (-2.92) (-3.91) (-1.46) (-3.52) (-3.63)
Transpauction -0.58 -0.59 -0.53 -0.57 -0.54 -0.73 -0.73
(-2.12) (-2.66) (-2.09) (-2.42) (-2.18) (-3.27) (-3.28)
ill resauction 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.04 -0.00 -0.01
(0.85) (0.22) (0.95) (0.02) (0.44) (-0.02) (-0.12)
ExposureSP500 -6.98 -6.05 -8.16 -1.85 -0.03 -2.00 -1.98
(-5.19) (-4.58) (-6.20) (-21.05) (-4.87) (-15.37) (-14.61)
Chg Default 0.36 0.48 0.28 0.61 1.51 0.66 0.68
(0.52) (0.76) (0.43) (0.85) (2.11) (0.91) (0.93)
Num of Obs 4005 4005 4005 4005 3607 4005 4005
R2 0.200 0.200 0.212 0.240 0.209 0.217 0.216
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
64Table A14: Illiquidity proxied by Greenspan-Guidotti measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposureauction -2.18 -2.09 -2.49 -0.44 -0.01 -0.35 -0.39
(-2.13) (-4.04) (-2.23) (-2.16) (-1.03) (-1.19) (-1.40)
Transpauction -0.18 -0.24 -0.20 -0.26 -0.18 -0.20 -0.24
(-0.57) (-0.74) (-0.65) (-0.72) (-0.51) (-0.43) (-0.54)
ill GGauction 0.32 0.30 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.40 0.37
(1.75) (1.51) (1.51) (1.14) (1.46) (1.27) (1.23)
ExposureSP500 -6.96 -6.04 -8.16 -1.85 -0.03 -2.00 -1.98
(-5.19) (-4.58) (-6.20) (-21.06) (-4.87) (-15.37) (-14.61)
Chg Default 0.36 0.48 0.29 0.61 1.50 0.66 0.68
(0.53) (0.76) (0.44) (0.85) (2.10) (0.91) (0.93)
Num of Obs 4005 4005 4005 4005 3607 4005 4005
R2 0.201 0.200 0.212 0.240 0.209 0.217 0.216
t statistics in parentheses
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
65Table A15: Announcement Dates: Full Specication
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
ExposureXauction -0.42 -0.25 -0.06 0.16 -0.00 0.14 0.13
(-0.43) (-0.68) (-0.07) (1.13) (-0.43) (0.78) (0.72)
TranspXauction 0.20 0.13 0.05 -0.05 0.13 0.19 0.20
(0.70) (0.50) (0.17) (-0.23) (0.47) (0.76) (0.81)
IlliquidXauction -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.00 -0.00
(-0.58) (1.93) (1.05) (0.10) (1.09) (-0.59) (-0.50)
ExposureXdate11 -14.76 5.18 -3.48 -2.69 0.01 -0.56 -0.91
(-1.62) (0.66) (-0.37) (-0.87) (0.25) (-0.19) (-0.30)
TranspXdate11 18.21 14.85 15.46 17.52 14.30 17.83 18.14
(3.33) (2.85) (2.89) (3.30) (2.56) (3.47) (3.49)
IlliquidXdate11 -0.33 -0.22 -0.23 -0.28 -0.31 -0.42 -0.40
(-1.52) (-2.02) (-1.91) (-1.49) (-3.05) (-2.60) (-2.39)
ExposureXdate12 -3.40 -25.09 -18.37 -8.66 -0.12 -7.65 -8.33
(-0.10) (-1.36) (-0.61) (-1.74) (-1.06) (-1.29) (-1.41)
TranspXdate12 -14.05 -11.44 -11.02 -6.54 -9.07 -10.62 -10.72
(-2.34) (-2.12) (-1.92) (-0.99) (-1.40) (-1.78) (-1.81)
IlliquidXdate12 -0.50 -0.55 -0.51 -0.24 -0.36 -0.20 -0.19
(-0.91) (-1.76) (-1.62) (-0.59) (-0.94) (-0.43) (-0.39)
ExposureXdate13 -42.89 -39.94 -42.76 -7.40 -0.39 5.79 4.94
(-1.24) (-1.15) (-1.26) (-0.75) (-2.07) (0.58) (0.49)
TranspXdate13 97.17 96.36 97.26 96.73 108.09 90.89 91.06
(4.99) (5.02) (4.97) (4.83) (5.21) (5.09) (5.11)
IlliquidXdate13 0.88 0.61 0.65 0.65 1.06 0.06 0.11
(0.26) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.31) (0.02) (0.03)
ExposureXdate14 -73.09 -74.99 -94.30 -44.46 -0.29 -46.21 -46.03
(-1.62) (-3.54) (-2.85) (-8.11) (-1.10) (-6.79) (-6.69)
TranspXdate14 -71.79 -69.06 -63.61 -50.05 -60.96 -75.93 -76.98
(-6.44) (-6.18) (-5.94) (-7.43) (-4.23) (-8.54) (-8.72)
IlliquidXdate14 0.68 -1.34 -0.85 0.34 -0.75 0.81 0.72
(0.52) (-2.09) (-1.24) (0.52) (-0.86) (0.85) (0.69)
ExposureXdate2 -85.29 -80.45 -102.39 -14.05 -0.05 -17.45 -17.99
(-4.50) (-5.04) (-5.56) (-2.22) (-0.13) (-2.51) (-2.64)
TranspXdate2 -25.29 -24.10 -21.22 -31.06 -30.52 -37.98 -38.17
(-3.15) (-3.13) (-2.70) (-3.84) (-2.57) (-4.89) (-4.92)
IlliquidXdate2 0.65 -0.52 -0.26 -0.36 -0.72 -0.17 -0.17
(1.76) (-1.65) (-0.60) (-1.30) (-1.08) (-0.47) (-0.46)
ExposureXSP500 -4.78 -4.17 -5.66 -1.21 -0.02 -1.29 -1.28
(-4.74) (-4.88) (-5.72) (-14.65) (-4.50) (-12.32) (-11.08)
Chg Default -0.05 0.03 -0.11 0.11 0.69 0.10 0.11
(-0.15) (0.08) (-0.34) (0.28) (1.73) (0.28) (0.30)
N 4000 4000 4000 4000 3601 4000 4000
R2 0.309 0.313 0.319 0.356 0.318 0.343 0.343
OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
t statistic in parentheses;
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
date11 refers to Dec 12, 2007. Lines introduced with ECB and SNB
date12 refers to Sep 18, 2008. Lines introduced with BOJ, BOE, and Bank of Canada
date13 refers to Sep 24, 2008. Lines introduced with Australia, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway
date14 refers to Oct 28, 2008. Lines introduced with NZL, Brazil, Mexico, Korea, and Singapore
date2 refers to Oct 13, 2008. Unlimited swaps introduced with ECB, BOE, BOJ, and SNB
66Table A16: Non-OECD countries only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Exports Imports Trade Assets(TIC) Assets(CPIS) Debt LTdebt
Exposureauction -3.11 -2.66 -2.64 -0.64 -0.00 -0.68 -0.72
(-2.21) (-3.34) (-1.91) (-2.70) (-0.52) (-2.89) (-3.00)
Transpauction -0.81 -1.06 -0.96 -0.93 -1.18 -1.19 -1.19
(-1.86) (-3.31) (-2.47) (-2.18) (-2.66) (-3.69) (-3.69)
Illiquidauction 2.48 1.27 1.08 1.56 1.03 1.85 1.93
(1.63) (1.74) (1.44) (1.92) (1.19) (2.40) (2.46)
ExposureSP500 -6.51 -8.17 -8.15 -1.95 -0.03 -2.06 -2.10
(-4.60) (-5.63) (-4.30) (-20.52) (-3.20) (-14.82) (-15.33)
Default -0.63 -0.56 -0.71 -0.44 0.04 -0.30 -0.30
(-2.47) (-2.63) (-3.04) (-1.77) (0.07) (-1.02) (-0.98)
Num of Obs 1785 1785 1785 1785 1387 1785 1785
R2 0.283 0.282 0.289 0.389 0.283 0.333 0.337
t statistic in parentheses; OLS with country xed eects, monthly time dummies, and robust standard errors.
 p < 0:05,
 p < 0:01
67